Comment by Daniel Smilov:
Bulgarian citizens voted for the seventh time in parliamentary elections in less than four years with an instruction to the people's representatives - and especially to the "winner" - to form a government. GERB and Borisov are angry that the "victory" them - although in general Pirova - was not celebrated with fanfare, but they are in no hurry to say how they will fulfill the main will of the voter. The US elections became a formal justification for the delay.
This in itself is an absurd set-up, but more on that later. The elections suffered from major defects and created doubts that the DPS-New Beginning party achieved its good result mainly because of help from the institutions. They gave her an unfair advantage in the battle for the DPS name, arrested her opponents and turned a blind eye to her manipulations - bought or controlled votes and committees. The video surveillance in Belica also showed the main scheme: a committee, which is clearly bought or influenced in some other illegitimate way, adjusts the results by adding and destroying ballots. Incidental, isolated actions of this nature make no sense at all - it is clearly a matter of systematic machinations in many places, which has also happened in other elections (local ones, for example). It became extremely clear why the parties engaged in similar practices - especially the DPS and GERB - are against voting by machines. They have their own political machinery, which the machines interfere with.
How fundamental and important issues were overshadowed
From this point of view, the return of compulsory machine voting - to which there is not a single empirically confirmed objection - is the main measure that can reduce abuses. The second is for the Ministry of the Interior to publish statistics on vote-buying signals - for which parties they are. The reasonable suspicion is that such information is not announced because these parties are mainly DPS and GERB. There can be no vote-buying signal without being clear for whom it is being bought: after all, the voter commits to a ballot number, a preference for a particular candidate, etc. And now it is clear, for example, what purpose the preferences for certain candidates fulfill: three displaced Rosen Zhelyazkov from the first place for GERB in Blagoevgrad. No one believes this is an outburst of civic activism - rather, it's a scheme to count a bought or controlled vote.
"Majesty" however, it overshadowed these fundamental and important issues in people's attention. The drama of this party is actually also the result of the manipulation of the vote: throwing out the ballots for small pariahs and those that were not with the 8 or 18 ballot, apparently helped "Greatness" to be below the line. It is no coincidence that more than the necessary 21 votes for the party were found only from the video surveillance. And from sections that do not carefully hide from the camera, but make mistakes simply out of confusion or fatigue. It was proper for the CEC to order a second recount of at least some questionable sections - the argument that it has no right to do so is absurd, because the CEC itself corrects errors and inconsistencies in the protocols of the CEC and the RIC, and the RIC has the right to conduct a recount when they find serious defects in the primary protocols. In reverse order with methodological guidelines and instructions, a partial recount would be quite possible. If DPS-New Beginning was just under four percent, there would certainly be a second, third, and fourth count until things settled down.
Should the elections be counted in this situation? The argument for referral to the SC seems indisputable, even in a situation where the Ministry of Internal Affairs does not cooperate, but reports "perfectly" your work done. After all, only a judicial decision by a higher authority can put to rest all the doubts that these elections have raised. And despite the systemic problems, it is still reasonable to only partially count the election if a recount of selected sections shows a better result for "Greatness".
The system's other defects will be fixed not by new elections, but by machine voting, disclosure of vote-buying parties, and political change that will insulate the buyers from the levers of the state.
Borisov's two options
Here we come to the essence of the problem: can those who manipulate elections and have informal influence on institutions be isolated from power? The PP-DB immediately attempted to organize a "sanitary cordon" around Delyan Peevski and his formation. The signing of a declaration is a symbolic act that is hardly a genius idea: instead of making the parties position themselves against Peevski, it will most likely lead to counter-declarations, which is simply shifting the issue.
But anyway, until the elections in the USA, as in the well-known story of Krastyo Sarafov, Borisov the man will think: will Peevski tsarot play or not. There are actually two options for the winner GERB.
The first one, which GERB themselves defined as "first" before the elections, is for GERB and PP-DB to try to form a government with a third partner. To the extent that PP-DB have consistently stated that this partner will not be DPS-New Beginning, ITN, BSP and the Dogan formation remain. All three complicate the equation, but this is one option anyway.
The second choice is a "minority government" of GERB, behind which stands a majority of GERB, DPS-New Beginning, ITN, BSP (and other individual MPs who left their groups). This option will rule out PP-DB, maybe "Sword" and "Revival", although there will certainly be support from Kostadinov's people, if not with votes for the government, then at least with key policies.
The choice for Borisov is difficult. If he prefers PP-DB, he will antagonize Peevski, and this is clearly impossible for him. In this version, Borisov will have to enter the Punta Mara regime on judicial reform, anti-corruption and regulators, with attempts to pull Peevski to participate in the management through GERB quotas (as in the previous "assembly". However, Peevski himself will be firmly against this, because he wants official participation in power.
The second option - GERB minority rule with support from Peevski and others - cannot be implemented without serious violence. Bulgaria may not turn into an open dictatorship, but it will rely on violent policies against opponents of the Borisov-Peevski administration. First, it will be necessary to cover up the traces of what was done against Dogan's DPS and the manipulations of the elections. This will require mastering completely and with new mandates of the prosecutor's office, Supreme Court and other bodies. Second, since the Borisov-Peevski administration will have a serious reputational problem, it will launch prosecutorial and repressive counterattacks against its main opponents - especially the PP-DB. The first line of counterattack is now clear - against Asen Vasilev for the fabricated "customs affair". Thirdly, for additional legitimacy, the national-patriotism of "Revival" will be attracted, with which the Bai-Ganiv character of the government will take on a complete form: manipulated elections, sopajiism, frank populism and shameless media.
Politicians and their own salvation
Many - apparently including Borisov - believe that a Donald Trump victory in the USA will make the repressive Bulgarian option possible. With a "transactional" president in the US, local discretion can be traded for reactor deals, for Turkish-Russian Stream-2, for something else. At the same time, American isolationism can free the hands of local rulers to adjust power to their liking.
With these accounts, many Bulgarian politicians will watch the elections in the USA. The paradox is that these elections will be more important for democracy and freedom in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Bulgaria and Hungary than for the Americans themselves.
Bulgarian society has the strength to oppose such a development. It will also have serious support to do so, both in Europe and America. But we are still faced with a choice that may turn out to be more significant than many have imagined.
And the "winner" Borisov seems to realize the drama of the situation. One of his historic contributions to our modern history is that he did not allow the corrupt practices - which flourished during his time - to lead to the collapse of democracy and pluralism in the country. The time has come to put this contribution to a serious test, however, because Borisov's main potential partner has shown himself to be quite unscrupulous.
We may see Boris' traditional solution to difficult problems - postponement. This would mean new elections, a new Glavchev, and perhaps even a return to Radev's offices. This delay could already prove to be a serious problem in itself and lead to the collapse of our political system in the next election. A parliament full of swords and shields can easily degenerate into a revolutionary convention - those who want to be Robespierre and in this one are not few.
One guideline in this situation will be the preservation of free, pluralistic and parliamentary democracy. The people have spoken - politicians must govern responsibly. And this means that, apart from their own salvation, they must also think about the future of the country. About freedom and the lack of repression in it.