Comment by Vesselin Stoynev:
Cordon sanitaire for Peevski, annulment of the elections, election of a speaker of parliament: these are the three factors on which it depends whether we will go to elections again.
The equation seems insoluble, because all three conditions are cumulative. PP-DB and the APS, ITN and MECH that support them (each with different nuances) say: 1) The elections were unfair because of Peevski, so we want them to be annulled (partially or in full); 2) Until the Constitutional Court rules, in order to limit Peevski's influence, his party should not participate in either the government or the leadership of the parliament; 3) In order to have guarantees that this will happen, the parties should sign a declaration with a commitment to active measures to limit Peevski's influence in power, before the Speaker of the National Assembly is elected.
GERB's response is symmetrical: 1) We will support any requests for cassation, if there is agreement for a government, if not - immediately go to elections (i.e. the fairness of the elections does not matter, we can repeat them without a court decision, i.e. again under the same, possibly unfair conditions); 2) There cannot be a cordon against DPS-New Beginning, because there is no good DPS (i.e. we refuse to get rid of Peevski); 3) If a parliamentary speaker from GERB is not elected, there will be no talks about a government with any mandate and we will go to elections (i.e. if one is elected, a majority for a government is ready, even if it is a minority one).
GERB cannot do without Peevski
Of the three factors, the key one is Peevski's isolation. The annulment of the vote is a threat with delayed effect, because it will take months for the Constitutional Court to rule on the merits (if it does at all) on such a voluminous case, requiring real court proceedings. And even if there is a decision for cassation, it will most likely not be complete, but partial, because it is very difficult to prove a complete taint of the vote with direct evidence. In such a case, the threat to a possible government, if it can be formed at all with a pending cassation, is almost zero.
The other factor – The election of the speaker of parliament, however, has the effect of an immediate detonation, because it must be triggered as early as Monday. If the GERB candidate is not elected, according to Borisov's requests, there will be no implementation of the first mandate, and GERB will not provide support for the second and third. However, if he is elected, then a government majority has been gathered - which is traditionally the litmus test for the election or removal of a parliamentary speaker.
In this situation, the fragmented new parliament also turns out to be polarized - along the Peevski axis. And the likely scenario for it to survive is for GERB to secure a majority that includes MRF-New Beginning and a third partner.
Does Peevski not have backup gates in the APS?
The only parliamentary formation outside of GERB and New Beginning that has not spoken out against Peevski is the Bulgarian Socialist Party. GERB, DPS-New Beginning and BSP-United Left, however, have 119 MPs. Two are not enough for even a minority government to be elected, i.e. they are not in the chamber for it to pass. Golden fingers can always be found, although in this already completely polarized situation this is almost impossible - they will not just be excluded from their groups, but politically crucified. Unless Dogan's APS hides reserves that could cross over to Peevski's New Beginning camp in a completely heroic manner.
Borisov is faced with the difficult dilemma of governing together with Peevski with unstable parliamentary support and accumulating a powerful multi-party opposition against himself, or taking responsibility for throwing the country into elections.
An anti-Peevski cabinet with a second or third mandate?
The option of forming a government with a second or third mandate from the diverse formations outside GERB and MRF-New Beginning seems very difficult, even in the only possible option of a non-partisan, expert cabinet with a limited time horizon. The stumbling block in it is "Vazrazhdane", which PP-DB may find more difficult to swallow than GERB because of Russia and the eurozone. However, there is one glue that could easily unite PP-DB, "Vazrazhdane", APS and MECH (and BSP or parts of it to accept this amalgam by necessity) – the destruction of the "Peevski" model. Such a government could deal serious blows against the behind-the-scenes networks and connections and hinder the election of the Prosecutor General by a simple majority through the ready-made amendments to the Law on the Judiciary, which prohibit the Supreme Judicial Council with an expired mandate from electing him. Even if he is attacked in the Constitutional Court, with his two newly appointed representatives in the court, the president, who is not on Peevski's side, could thwart the vilification of the law.
This is a very risky option for Borisov and Peevski, so if the GERB leader has not secured support for the first term, he would hardly risk implementing an alternative government with a subsequent term. Therefore, he would probably take a serious step back on Monday. However, it again depends on resolving the dilemma "with or without Peevski".