"Thanks to digital communications, intercontinental missiles, air travel, space satellites, and many other technologies, different parts of the globe now influence each other as closely as different regions of Germany did in the 1920s and 1930s. [...] Will this new global Weimar suffer the same catastrophic fate as the old German Weimar? The latest work of the American reporter Robert Kaplan, Wasteland: A World in Permanent Crisis, published in the United States in January, reads like a thriller. But it is not fiction at all. A geopolitician and bestselling author, Kaplan finds the similarities between our era and the one that plunged Germany, and then the world, into chaos in the 1930s "disturbing." He says the world has become a giant Weimar Republic. "So instead of a Germany fragmented into interconnected states, where a crisis in one can quickly spread to the rest, we now live in a world where each country is so deeply connected to the others that a crisis in one place can trigger a domino effect with almost universal consequences," writes the author, who doesn't expect the arrival of Hitler 2.0 - "The world is still too diverse" and "Every tyrant is unique." Other factors of instability include: "technological demons that will swarm", as well as the decline of great powers such as Russia, China and the United States, which "marks the end of the stabilizing virtues of imperialism". Known both for the accuracy of his geopolitical analyses and for his image as a "prophet of chaos", Robert Kaplan nevertheless reminds us that "no analyst can predict with certainty the state of a country in a few decades. What a journalist or analyst can do is make the reader less surprised by what will happen in a given region in the medium term."
In an exclusive interview with the French newspaper L'Express, the man whom Foreign Policy magazine named one of the "100 Greatest Global Thinkers" in 2011, examines the most sensitive regions of the planet: Russia after Putin, tensions in the Pacific, Trump's America, as well as the many challenges facing Europe. And in conclusion, the author gives us a spark of hope...
L'EXPRESS: "Order must precede freedom, because without order there is no freedom for anyone. The Weimar Republic, deprived of the necessary order, ultimately became a threat to freedom, despite the "artistic explosion it generated", you write, drawing a parallel with the state of the world today. What similarities do you see between the two eras? Germany and the planet are not on the same level...
ROBERT KAPLAN: That's right! The similarities between the Weimar Republic and our world today are essentially a matter of geographical scale. The limited size of the Earth is a factor of instability. As the world becomes more interconnected and technology shrinks distances, we find ourselves as close to each other as one Weimar Republic resident was to another back then. The Weimar Republic was an empire without an emperor. In its desire not to reproduce the autocracies of the Kaiser and Bismarck, it went to the opposite extreme, adopting a constitution that made its system fundamentally ungovernable, with continuous governmental crises. Germany was fragmented into interconnected states. A crisis in one could quickly spread to the others. Our world today is in the same situation: we are more interconnected than ever before in many ways, and yet crises follow one another. The conflict in the Middle East could now provoke a domestic crisis in the United States on a scale once unimaginable. An escalation in Taiwan or the South China Sea would have immediate repercussions on global stock markets. The war in Ukraine affects all of Europe as well as the United States and the West. So we move from one crisis to another, in what I call "global chaos". And as I explain in my book, an interconnected world, but without real governance, is a vulnerable world.
L"EXPRESS: How to restore world order?
R. KAPLAN: I don't see a quick fix. But I also don't foresee a new Hitler. The world is still too diverse for such a scenario to repeat itself. I also point out that the Weimar Republic could have had a different outcome. It was not inevitable that everything would end with Hitler. History is not simply a matter of fate or determinism: it is also shaped by countless human accidents. So I use the example of Weimar as a warning for our current world, which will become even closer, more claustrophobic, increasingly anxious and more connected, even if there is nothing resembling a world government.
L"EXPRESS: Do you think that the leaders of modern democracies are unaware of the dangers to global stability, just as the German elite were unaware of the rise of Nazism?
R. KAPLAN: In fact, the Weimar Republic had several great intellectual leaders. Gustav Stresemann and Heinrich Brüning, for example [editor's note: chancellors in 1923 and 1930 respectively], were competent technocrats. The problem was not so much the quality of the leaders as the ungovernability of the system. Especially when we consider the economic cataclysms of the time, which left many Germans unemployed or destroyed their lives through inflation and which in a sense opened the way to extremes.
I would not call the current democratic leaders incompetent, but rather mediocre. In the United States, we tend to attribute almost emotional importance to figures like Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden simply because they ruled during our lifetimes. But I realistically think they will go down in history as second-rate presidents. Only George W. Bush will leave a lasting but negative mark because of the Iraq war. As for Donald Trump, he is a world-historical figure, but again for the wrong reasons. In Europe, Olaf Scholz, Keir Starmer or even Emmanuel Macron - who, while competent, hardworking and innovative - also seem to be mediocre leaders. Surprisingly, the best prime minister in Europe at the moment comes from a country that is not central to the global political game: Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Greece. He is perhaps the best Greek leader in decades. But Greece remains a country of about 10 million inhabitants, with a negligible influence on the main global dynamics that I discuss in my book.
L"EXPRESS: You seem to have lost faith in international institutions, especially the UN...
R. KAPLAN: Well, if NATO is a reality, an organization that matters a lot, then the UN, on the other hand, has much less power and influence today than it did during the Cold War. In the United States, when I was a child, everyone knew the name of the UN Secretary-General. He enjoyed real fame. Today, few people outside foreign policy circles would mention its name. The UN has become an international organization like any other. It is true that it conducts many investigations and provides aid to many developing countries, but when it comes to the big issues of war and peace, its influence is much less than it used to be. You will also notice that people often talk about Davos and the Bilderberg Group and less and less about the UN...
L"EXPRESS: "Although communism died in Europe in 1989, the spiritual and political destruction it caused - not to mention the architectural damage - continues to this day and plays a major role in our ongoing crisis," you are sorry. Isn't that a bit of an exaggeration? Communism now affects only a handful of countries in the world...
R. KAPLAN: Quite the opposite! I think communism still plays an important role in the world today, if only because Putin's system is largely derived from it. Let's remember that the Soviet Union lasted seven decades and caused far more social destruction among the population than the occupation of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. And that social and moral destruction, I think, shaped today's Russia. As proof, Putin now holds more power than any Russian leader since Stalin. So if you take into account both the legacy of communism in Russia and the still strong influence of Leninism in China, these are two of the greatest powers in the world. So you see, the legacy of communism remains significant.
L"EXPRESS: The Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whom you describe as a "conservative devoted to order", was, as you write, "saddened by Russia's military disaster in the early stages of the war in Ukraine". If he were alive, what would he think of Putin?
R. KAPLAN: You would probably call him a failed leader because he dragged Russia into such a devastating war that it weakened the Russian Empire, whether in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, etc. A conflict that has been going on for three years now and has literally absorbed all of Russia's energy, financial resources, and manpower. Solzhenitsyn, who was an ardent Russian nationalist, would have been deeply upset by this situation. A great thinker, he particularly emphasized the incompetence of Tsar Nicholas II, while recognizing the lack of a viable alternative to the latter. Although Solzhenitsyn always considered Ukraine to be part of Russia, he would probably have seen the strategic errors of this invasion.
L"EXPRESS: In your opinion, the consequences of the war in Ukraine in the coming years "could have the most serious consequences, both for good and for bad".
R. KAPLAN: Yes. I think the media coverage tends to normalize events. The war in Ukraine continues. Tens of thousands of people are dying, tanks are being destroyed. And yet, today it has been relegated to the second or third page of the newspapers, as if it had become "something very ordinary". This normalization is gradually making us lose sight of the intensity of this war, as well as its emotional impact. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the war in Ukraine is a major turning point, the consequences of which will have a lasting impact on Russia and Europe. Especially the period after Putin...
L"EXPRESS: So?
R. KAPLAN: Russia has always been relatively uninstitutionalized. Its vast territory spans 11 time zones, covering almost half of the Earth's length, and yet it has never been fully governed. Let's make an analogy: if Xi Jinping were to fall ill or die tomorrow, the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party would elect a new leader. China has a strong bureaucracy and a comprehensive system. The transition will not be easy, but a successor will be quickly determined. This may lead to profound change... or not. But there will be no chaos. On the other hand, if Putin dies tomorrow, there is no clear mechanism to guarantee an organized transition. Everything is focused on him, which makes the situation extremely uncertain. In terms of potential chaos, Russia after Putin could even become a version of the former Yugoslavia.
L"EXPRESS: What will Putin's life be like after the war?
R. KAPLAN: If there is a peace agreement, Putin's future will depend primarily on the state of the Russian economy. This is the main factor that keeps him in power and which may still allow him to remain in power after the war is over. Oligarchs and senior military officials in Russia are wary of his departure for fear of chaos. Some form of anarchy could easily arise after Putin. Many among these elites may personally believe that he made a mistake by invading Ukraine, but they do not see a figure or political force capable of replacing him without causing a major internal crisis.
L"EXPRESS: What will be the verdict of history on the Russian leader?
R. KAPLAN: He will be judged severely, including by the Russians themselves, for invading Ukraine. Look at how much power and influence Putin had in Europe before this war. In a sense, he had turned Germany into a neutral power, heavily dependent on Russian gas. However, as soon as he attacked Ukraine and the operation went awry, he lost a significant part of his influence. And although Russia now appears to have the advantage on the ground, the cost is enormous.
L"EXPRESS: You describe Russia's decline as "fundamental and quantitative". Conversely, you assess "American decline as relative, subtle, and qualitative".
R. KAPLAN: Indeed. Russia will be the first of the great powers to decline. The United States is in a much more advantageous position. The reason is simple: it is a turbulent, restless democracy. This means that it has a constant capacity for self-improvement. Trump is not the first uneducated and unsophisticated populist to become president of the United States. Before him was Andrew Jackson, the country's seventh president and a native of Tennessee. He was rough and uncouth. His election deeply shocked the elites of Virginia and Massachusetts, who had ruled the country until then. They feared that his coming to power would destroy the country. But it was not so. This simply created a new American dynamic.
L"EXPRESS: You write: "Trump is even more vain and superficial than von Papen" (the penultimate chancellor of the Weimar Republic, accused of being a springboard for Hitler, ed.). This can hardly be called a compliment. Will his re-election lead to global chaos or will he be able to restore order?
R. KAPLAN: It's hard to analyze Trump because he himself may not know what he's going to do tomorrow in the Middle East or elsewhere. He's constantly changing his mind, which makes him harder to pin down than other leaders. But I think he's an instrument of American decline. Although he denies it and claims otherwise, I believe he embodies that decline, and there are several reasons for that. Let's start with footage from his inauguration on January 20: all the big tech moguls were there with him - Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, Tim Cook and others. The concentration of money and power has never been as strong as it is today in the United States. Of course, big businessmen have always been interested in who is president, and they have always tried to influence the government. But before that, they had to go through bureaucratic systems to do it. From now on, everything depends on proximity to the president. If you are close to him, your company can earn tens of billions of dollars more. It is precisely these things that destroy institutions and weaken democracy. Thus, the image of the investiture showed a country that is gradually declining institutionally.
L"EXPRESS: Elon Musk made a series of contradictory statements about Europe and its leaders. Is this a source of instability?
R. KAPLAN: His relationship with Trump is very unhealthy. The fact that the richest man in the world is so closely connected to the most powerful man in the world, almost in the form of a hug, should raise serious questions. The famous Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote that the greatness of America lies not in its people, but in its institutions and the separation of powers. He says that it is this institutional framework - the 50 states, the federal government, the local and state levels of government - that has shaped American power... Under Trump, we are seeing these institutions being tested. The president's enormous power is reaching a worrying climax.
L"EXPRESS: "All three great powers seem to have produced leaders driven by a death wish, each driven by his own personal anguish," you write.
R. KAPLAN: Donald Trump seems too superficial to be tormenting himself. Putin, on the other hand, must be in internal turmoil over the war he himself started. As for Xi Jinping, the object of his torment is this: he seeks to transform China into a more developed middle-class society than it is today, but rejects any form of protest. But history shows us that the middle class is never satisfied. They always demand more, always demand more efficient government. This is a contradiction that I think is eating away at Xi Jinping: he wants to exercise absolute control over his people, but he also wants them to get rich. But you can't have both...
L" EXPRESS: In your opinion, "the greatest danger will always be the loss of self-control". Which leader do you think is most likely to lose it?
R. KAPLAN: As I wrote, it's a Shakespearean question. Today, everything seems to be based on geography, on vast and impersonal forces, until there comes a point when everything changes and becomes a Shakespearean drama, entirely focused on the decisions of one man, on what he's going to do tomorrow. A tortured leader, crushed by crises, overwhelmed by conflicting advice and the need to make important decisions. I think the best current example of a Shakespearean leader, who is under extreme levels of anxiety and pressure, but still reacts to the moment, is Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel. Think about it: he makes a decision, a Palestinian leader is killed. He reacts instantly, another Palestinian leader is eliminated. He is also in the middle of a criminal trial that could send him to prison. His people want him to admit responsibility for October 7 and face the consequences. There are internal struggles in his government, terrible clashes that eventually come to light. And yet he has been in power longer than any other Israeli prime minister. That is why Netanyahu embodies for me the archetype of the Shakespearean leader.
L"EXPRESS: You talk at length about Xi Jinping and Putin, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is mentioned only once in your book. Isn't he a threat to global stability?
R. KAPLAN: It is impossible to cover everything in 186 pages! Besides, the book was finished before Kim Jong-un sent troops into Ukraine. However, I believe that Kim Jong-un, Putin, the leaders of Iran and China are part of the Eurasian Union, which is essentially opposed to the United States, Ukraine, Israel, the conservative Sunni Arab states and Europe. By the way, I already wrote on this topic more than ten years ago: we are witnessing the emergence of Eurasia as a geopolitical concept in its own right, whereas before it was only a geographical concept, too broad to have any real meaning at the geopolitical level.
L"EXPRESS: After reading your book, we came to the conclusion that Xi Jinping, whom you consider to be "more methodical" than Putin, poses a much greater threat to global stability than Russia...
R. KAPLAN: Yes. The conflicts in the Middle East have not had that much of an effect on financial markets, nor has the war in Ukraine. Because, and this is an interesting point, our markets have, as they say in the United States, "integrated" these wars into their forecasts. In contrast, a conflict over Taiwan or in the Western Pacific involving China and the United States, or even Japan to the south and the East China Sea, would pit two or three of the world's largest economies against each other in a real war. That would have a devastating impact on financial markets and, in general, on the incomes of the world's population. I think Xi Jinping knows this. And so do the Americans. And let's not forget that China is heavily dependent on American consumers. Ironically, the fear of economic catastrophe is one of the things that keeps the peace between the United States and China.
L"EXPRESS: "A war for Taiwan would not be like a war for Ukraine. Taiwan would be a "Star Wars" war of the mid-21st century," you say. What exactly do you mean?
R. KAPLAN: We think of the western Pacific in terms of naval forces because it is essentially a huge body of water. Flotillas, aircraft carriers, and major naval battles like those of World War II still come to mind. But things wouldn't happen that way today. Now any warship has enough firepower to destroy a medium-sized city, and its weapons systems are almost completely automated. This means that artificial intelligence would play a decisive role in any Pacific war. That is why I think the biggest risk our world faces today is the possibility of a major conflict in the Pacific. A clear, immediate threat, right in front of us.
L" EXPRESS: "The UN seems old-fashioned, perhaps because it reflects the distribution of powers inherited from the post-war period, where France has a permanent seat on the Security Council, while India, a central player in the global balance, does not," you point out. Your observation is not very flattering for France. How do you see our country and Europe?
R. KAPLAN: As for Ukraine, although Europe provided support to Kiev, it was mainly American dollars and weapons that really made the difference and allowed Zelensky's troops to resist. Moreover, in the wars in Gaza and the Middle East, Europe remained largely in the background. This is an interesting point: Russia has imposed itself through its alliance with Iran, China has exerted pressure on the negotiations, but Europe has not played a decisive role in these conflicts. Europe faces several strategic challenges: to the east, the war in Ukraine, and to the south, migratory pressure from regions with high population growth, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Greater Middle East. But unlike the United States, protected by two oceans, Europe is directly exposed to these transformations, which makes it particularly vulnerable and complicates its position. As for France, its influence has always been greater than its demographic and military weight. But the problem in France is similar to the problem in the United States: the country is divided between a technocratic class that knows how to govern and solve public affairs, and a populist class that may not know how to govern but is more in tune with the expectations of the population. This dilemma complicates the room for maneuver for French leaders, especially in Ukraine. It is difficult for them to act without uniting with the United States.
L" EXPRESS: You refute the thesis defended by Harvard professor Steven Pinker that violence will inevitably decrease. According to you, we are just as evil as before, it is just that technology has evolved.
R. KAPLAN: Pinker is a great thinker and his book "The Better Angels of Our Nature" was very interesting. He explains that violence has decreased relatively. I admit that this may be true, but only because the world population has grown so much that violence seems proportionally less. I do not agree with him when he claims that human nature has changed for the better. In my opinion, it is not human nature that has evolved, but technology. Instead of killing each other, we are now stealing each other's identities online or committing all kinds of cybercrimes. The digital world is full of crime and chaos. While not violent in the physical sense, these actions can destroy lives and reputations. So when Pinker says that violence has decreased in relative terms, he is right. But when he says that human nature has changed, I think he is wrong.
L"EXPRESS: Some describe you as the "prophet of chaos". Give us a reason for hope... Do you see a way to avoid a cataclysm in the future?
R. KAPLAN: As long as we remain committed to the principles of liberalism and the importance of the individual. As long as we don't succumb to the psychology of the crowd, I think there will be hope. A lot of hope.