Alexander Lukashenko's rule in Belarus is based on two agreements.
The first is public and concerns the country's internal affairs: in exchange for the provision of the existential minimum of goods and services, Belarusians must give up such socio-political activity that would develop as an alternative to the governing status quo. In other words: as long as you have bread on the table, electricity at home and gasoline in the car, you have no right to say who and how to govern the country. This is a characteristic type of agreement that some Asian countries still adhere to to this day.
The second agreement concerns Belarus' foreign affairs: in exchange for the provision of preferential prices for Russian hydrocarbons and a generally assured market for its exports, Minsk gives up an independent policy in the field of foreign affairs, defense and security. In other words: goods for sovereignty.
The first contract was concluded between Lukashenko and his compatriots, the second - between the Belarusian president and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. Unlike legitimate contracts, neither of the two mentioned is a function of a voluntary act and free will. This means that neither the Belarusians necessarily agree to be a party to the agreement with Lukashenko, in which he buys them political freedom in exchange for the economic minimum, nor does the Belarusian president necessarily agree to delegate the sovereignty of his country to the Russian head of state in exchange for cheaper hydrocarbons. In fact, in both contracts, the Belarusians are victims - the citizens of Lukashenko, Lukashenko - of Putin.
Something more. These two contracts often have a stabilizing relationship with each other. For example, when in 2020, in the wake of the flawed presidential elections, Belarusians organized serious protests in the country, Lukashenko - in order to stabilize his positions and power, resorted to a foreign policy instrument: support from Vladimir Putin. And vice versa: when in the years before 2020, the Russian president was exerting pressure to intensify integration between Russia and Belarus, Lukashenko justified himself with the sentiments of his fellow citizens.
But it was precisely the events of 2020-2021 that put Lukashenko in a situation in which he could no longer continue to bicker between his people and Putin. Then he was faced with the largest and most persistent protests since he was at the head of the country, since 1994. And the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on him, which ended the already weak attempts to ease relations between Belarus and the West. The latter was especially important because, by supporting the protests in the country, Brussels and Washington actually predetermined Lukashenko's behavior. Faced with the wall under the pressure of the protests and the West, in order to preserve his power, which is always the main and most important goal of a dictator, he turned to Vladimir Putin. But this time, the Kremlin, realizing the lack of options for Lukashenko, as well as the fact that the protests in Belarus were more against his rule than against Russia, set an even higher price for the salvation of the Belarusian head of state: if he wanted to survive politically, Lukashenko had to stop dragging his feet and take real steps to implement the Union State between Russia and Belarus, otherwise declared in 1999. That is why in 2021 Lukashenko and Putin signed 28 programs, each of which aimed at unification between the two countries in various areas: the tax system and customs duties, the banking sector, their energy system, etc.
This integration process, expressed in Minsk's practical dependence on Moscow, further intensified after the start of the war in Ukraine. Then the territory of Belarus was used as a starting point for Russia's land invasion of Kiev, as well as for carrying out Russian strikes on Ukrainian targets. Belarus also plays the role of a "security zone" for Russian weapons stocks and logistical lines, since Ukraine cannot carry out strikes on Belarusian territory without risking opening a second front, bringing Minsk into the war. Meanwhile, Russian nuclear tactical missiles were also deployed on the territory of Belarus.
Belarus, along with Ukraine and the Baltic countries (primarily Latvia and Estonia) represent the first circle of countries of immediate interest to Russia. In the Kremlin's strategic thinking, each of these countries is something like an extension of Russia; a second, neighboring or simply Russia there (as opposed to the "here", "original" and "first" Russia). Without controlling the territories of these countries, Moscow feels cold: the Russian core is "naked" when it is not "clothed" by these immediate lands; like a bear without fur. Thus, "Russia-here" has the systematic aspiration to establish control over "Russia-there". To this end, Moscow has consistently arrested the sovereignty of Belarus and waged war for that of Ukraine (the Baltic states’ membership in NATO has prevented Russia from exercising similar freedom of action towards them).
However, when Moscow establishes control over these “neighboring” or “second Russia” states, whether in its imperial or socialist period, it automatically directs its geopolitical gaze towards the second circle of states towards which the Kremlin also has a strategic relationship. These are the countries in Eastern Europe from Bulgaria to Poland. If Moscow cannot establish direct and firm control over them, the plan is at least for them to play the role of a periphery, the purpose of which is to provide space (i.e. buffer) and time (for reaction) for the Russian Leviathan. As part of the periphery, the sovereignty of these countries must be half-hearted, so as to allow for “soft” or “hard” interventions by the power center of the Russian metropolis. In the field of the periphery, pursuing a policy of national interest, arising as a statement of the will of the specific people, becomes impossible, since the sanctioning external force of the Kremlin would impede any policy that is contrary to its interest. In the conditions of existence as a Russian periphery (or any other periphery!), no country can be independent. Therefore, it is particularly paradoxical that Russophilia in Eastern Europe is often dressed up as patriotism. And this is an oxymoron, since a patriot must protect the sovereignty of his country, and not delegate it to a foreign power center.
The closer a country is to Russia in the political sense of the word, the less independence and sovereignty it has. Belarus is a clear example in this direction. In fact, the governing chronology of Alexander Lukashenko is a summary of how a country loses its sovereignty and independence. In parallel with the Union State between Moscow and Minsk, this is also happening through Belarus' participation in Russian-dominated alliances such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Even in these formats, Minsk stands out as the capital with the least freedom of action (compared to Kazakhstan or Armenia).
Alexander Lukashenko ran for president of Belarus in the recent elections, but Vladimir Putin actually won. Of course, the long-serving president of Belarus has his own share of the blame for his closeness to the Kremlin turning into a hostage crisis.