In 1904, Halford Mackinder, the founder of geopolitics, proclaimed the advent of a new era after the Great Geographical Discoveries. According to him, it would be marked by a confrontation between land and sea powers for control of Eurasia. In The Eurasian Century (W.W. Norton & Company), recently published in English, Hal Brands updates this theory and shows how the struggle for dominance over this supercontinent has marked the 20th century with clashes between expansionist authoritarian powers, such as Germany, and a coalition of partially democratic states around the United States. "The struggle for the Eurasian landmass and its surrounding seas is the defining feature of international relations in the modern era. It is the hearth in which the modern world was forged. And that struggle is raging again today," he wrote.
According to the professor at Johns Hopkins University and a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, the United States and Europe today can draw valuable lessons from the 20th century to confront the "Eurasian fortress" made up of authoritarian regimes such as China, Russia or Iran. In a lengthy interview with the French newspaper L'Express, he explains why democracies should prepare for a period of extremely "dangerous" confrontations in the face of the ambitions of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. He also analyzes Donald Trump's thunderous first moves and the risks that the new president of the United States poses to the American system of alliances, which is nevertheless essential against China and Russia.
L'EXPRESS: How could the struggle for supremacy over Eurasian territory become the key to international relations not only in the 20th century, but also in the 21st century?
HAL BRANDS: I started writing the book after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared their "unlimited friendship". In recent years, there has been a struggle to change the balance of power in key regions of Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. All of this is part of a broader competition between states that see themselves as defenders of the international order and those who want to revise, disrupt or overthrow it. I tried to put this into perspective by looking at past conflicts when the balance of power in Eurasia was shifted, and I tried to draw lessons for today.
L'EXPRESS: You are basing your argument on the writings of the British geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), one of the founding fathers of geopolitics. In what sense, despite his racist views, do you think Mackinder was a visionary in the development of international relations?
H. BRANDS: Mackinder was not what we would call a progressive today. He was a staunch British imperialist with racially backward views. In that respect, he was a man of his time. On the other hand, he was ahead of his time, seeing that at the beginning of the 20th century we were moving from one historical period to another. The previous era had been marked by the expansion of European powers. Technological revolutions and advances in steam and navigation allowed Europeans to conquer much of the world, the Americas, Africa, and Asia. But this era ended when Europeans colonized everything they could. Mackinder therefore argued that the international system would increasingly be marked by confrontations between great powers, rather than between great powers and less developed societies. Mackinder delivered his famous lecture "The Geographical Center of History" in 1904, just as Russia was completing the Trans-Siberian Railway. It then became easier to move large armies across Eurasia, as it had been during the time of Genghis Khan and the Mongol invasions.
Mackinder's prediction was that this new era of international relations would be dominated by turmoil in Eurasia, and that aggressive states would attempt to gain hegemony over this territory, using it for global projection. He believed that these Eurasian states would face maritime powers, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. Mackinder was wrong about some things. He focused on Russia, while in the first half of the 20th century the greatest challenges to democracies were posed by Germany and Japan. But he was right in believing that this century would be marked by titanic clashes for control of Eurasia.
L'EXPRESS: The First World War is often seen as a stupid war between nationalisms. You, on the contrary, believe that it was the result of the expansionist aspirations of an illiberal Germany...
H. BRANDS: A school of thought has developed in the United States that World War I was almost an accident and that it happened for no good reason. I think that is wrong. The main issue in that conflict was whether Germany would succeed in creating an illiberal empire stretching from the English Channel to the Caucasus. The coalition between France, the United Kingdom, Russia and then the United States tried to prevent this. We forget that Germany in 1917 and early 1918 had achieved a large part of that goal. Then the French and the British were put under pressure and Russia, after the Russian Revolution, signed an armistice. It was only when the United States actually entered the conflict that the Western powers were able to reverse the German gains.
L'EXPRESS: In the 20th century, democracies always defeated illiberal powers, such as Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Isn't that a good sign given the current situation?
H. BRANDS: That gives cause for optimism, but we shouldn't assume that everything will work out in the end. In the 20th century, with the two world wars and then the Cold War, coalitions led by liberal democracies eventually prevailed over expansionist powers trying to gain control of Eurasia. But these upheavals caused a lot of death and disaster. Back then, these victories were not inevitable. During World War I, Germany had a real chance of winning. During World War II, until 1942, the Axis powers were in a favorable position. Similarly, there were several moments, especially early on, when the Cold War seemed to turn in favor of the Soviet Union. It took enormous effort, but also luck, for the democracies to prevail. Let's not forget this in the face of modern challenges!
L'EXPRESS: Why do you call the current alliance between Vladimir Putin's Russia, Xi Jinping's China, and Shiite Iran "Fortress Eurasia"?
H. BRANDS: I called it "Fortress Eurasia" to remind people that geography matters. It is easier for countries to cooperate if they share common borders, or as is the case between Iran and Russia, if they are connected by an inland sea, the Caspian. It is easier to make deals and to circumvent international sanctions. These autocracies are uniting not only because they have a common goal of challenging the international order, but also because geography helps them.
L'EXPRESS: Unlike China, Russia can no longer aspire to global hegemony, in your opinion, but it can still do a lot of damage...
H. BRANDS: We have seen the limits of Russian power in Ukraine. The Russians have been fighting this war for three years and have conquered about 20% of Ukrainian territory, but they have paid a huge price for it. But it is a mistake to reduce Russia to a mere declining power, or even a regional power. It is still capable of waging aggressive wars so shocking that they can destabilize the international order. And Moscow can still sow chaos in other parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Russia is therefore still a destructive force, even if, unlike China, it no longer has the means to be the leader of an alternative world order.
L'EXPRESS: How long can this alliance between Russia and China last? As a neighboring country with a border of more than 4,000 kilometers, won't Russia be the first victim of China's expansionist policy?
H. BRANDS: This alliance will not last forever, because if China succeeds in achieving Xi Jinping's ambitions, it will probably threaten Russia even more than the United States or the West. The problem is that this will not happen immediately. In the short term, China and Russia have strong common interests. Both want to overhaul the international system and see the United States and its alliances as the first limit to their ambitions. Both regimes are autocratic and feel uncomfortable in a world ruled by democracies and their allies. Moreover, there is a real personal relationship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. This could change. But for now, we must accept that this Sino-Russian rapprochement will become the most important fact in international relations in the coming years.
L'EXPRESS: We knew that alliances meant little to Donald Trump. But upon his return to the White House, the American president took another step, demanding Greenland from Denmark and launching a tariff blackmail campaign against Canada and Mexico. Is this the end of the US-led Western alliance?
H. BRANDS: It is too early to say. Trump does not see the world as divided into democracies and autocracies. He does not see himself as the guardian of the international order that the United States and its allies have maintained since the end of World War II. He sees the world as a zero-sum game.
From here, we can consider two scenarios. In the first, Trump pursues disruptive policies that could ultimately strengthen the international system he inherited. If he insists on renegotiating NATO so that European countries spend more on defense, this could strengthen the democratic community, even if there are many obstacles in the way. Similarly, with regard to Trump’s positions on Greenland and Panama, it can be said that the security of the Western Hemisphere is threatened by the actions of autocratic powers, especially China, and that the United States has doubts about the ability of Denmark or Panama to combat these influences. One can imagine that even if Trump makes sensational statements, he will ultimately be content with an agreement that strengthens the strategic interests of the United States.
On the other hand, in a more worrying scenario, the United States takes coercive measures against its allies in order to strengthen its position in the Western sphere. But this will deprive Western countries of the opportunity to protest when Russia and China take similar actions within their own spheres of influence. If Trump weakens NATO, we will be in a much worse situation than before. But it is only two weeks since the inauguration of his new administration, and it is difficult to predict how all this will end. One thing is certain: the possible upheavals are significantly greater than under any other American president...
L'EXPRESS: To what extent were alliances between democratic states, as well as with other more autocratic states, key to containing rival powers striving for hegemony?
H. BRANDS: Since the First World War and even more so after the Second World War, the core of these alliances has always been democratic states. But non-democratic states have also played a vital role in maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia. This is clearly the case with the Soviet Union, which played a decisive role during World War II against Nazi Germany. But during the Cold War, the United States also had to ally itself with dictators. Today, this is inevitable again. There is no possible balance in the Middle East that does not include cooperation with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. There is no way to limit China's power in Asia without relying on India, Vietnam or other countries that are not liberal democracies. These strategic trade-offs are inevitable. That is why the United States must do everything it can to maintain an international system that favors democratic values. But this will necessarily require tactical alliances with non-democratic regimes.
L'EXPRESS: Can Donald Trump really leave Europe alone against Russia?
H. BRANDS: I don't think Trump will leave formal alliances like NATO. His diplomacy consists of threatening to shoot the hostage in order to obtain concessions in the form of trade benefits or increased military spending. If he does indeed leave NATO, he loses all leverage over European countries. For me, the greater danger is that Trump will devalue this alliance, for example by not respecting Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which states that an attack on one member state is considered an attack on all.
L'EXPRESS: What will his position be on China?
H. BRANDS: Trump wants to reach a deal that will recalibrate economic relations between the United States and China. To do this, he will use pressure tactics such as increasing tariffs. Among his advisors are "hawks" who see China as the most serious threat to America. From a structural point of view, many geopolitical and ideological factors also lead to greater confrontation between the two superpowers. My prediction is this: Trump will do everything to achieve favorable negotiations with Xi Jinping, but in the end, the Sino-American rivalry will intensify over the next four years.
L'EXPRESS: Donald Trump expressed doubts about whether he would defend Taiwan against a possible Chinese invasion. Could Xi Jinping use his mandate to launch a military attack?
H. BRANDS: Xi Jinping will only take this risk if he is sure of military success and has exhausted all other options. If Trump tries to find some form of agreement on Taiwan, it will be more effective for China to take a series of gradual measures, including an embargo on the island. This would allow him to demonstrate to the Taiwanese that the United States does not necessarily have their backs in the event of a crisis, which would weaken the population's will to resist.
L'EXPRESS: Your book paints a bleak future. In your opinion, a global conflict can no longer be ruled out...
H. BRANDS: We are heading into a dangerous period of high tension and perhaps conflict in key regions. A war broke out in Ukraine in 2022, another in the Middle East in 2023. We must realize that this risks becoming the norm, not the exception. This does not mean that a third world war is inevitable. But we will have to do much more to preserve an international system that has benefited so many countries around the world for decades.
L'EXPRESS: Isn't the "Eurasian Fortress" formed by China, Russia or Iran weaker than we think? Iran has been significantly weakened since October 7, the Russian economy is overheating and even China has shown unexpected economic weakness after Covid-19...
H. BRANDS: Autocratic regimes are often weaker than they seem. There has indeed been good news in recent months. The Iranian "Axis of Resistance" has been significantly weakened in the Middle East. But there were bad ones, too. Putin's regime has shown greater resilience than anyone imagined in 2022 and 2023. From a Western and Ukrainian perspective, the war has been quiet for more than a year. We must have confidence in the strength and competence of democratic states. But we must not be naive enough to think that all our enemies will collapse on their own.