"My good friends, for the second time in our history a British Prime Minister returns from Germany, bringing peace with honor. I believe that this is peace for our time. Thank you with all my heart. Go home and sleep peacefully."
With these words, spoken by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in September 1938, he explains why Hitler agreed to receive part of Czechoslovakia. We are talking about the concluded Munich Agreement, which gave the Sudetenland to Germany. According to the prime minister of the island state, "the settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem, which has now been achieved, in my opinion, is only a prelude to a larger order in which all of Europe can find peace".
American President Donald Trump also loves peace. Or at least that is how he packages his reluctance to continue US support for Ukraine. In the name of this peace between Kiev and Moscow, the head of the White House has already stated that both sides must make concessions.
In fact, Trump has already made the first concession, and it is at a conceptual level. By agreeing to negotiate with the Russian president regarding Ukraine, but without the participation of Volodymyr Zelensky, Donald Trump accepted Vladimir Putin's starting condition and turned upside down the previous principle of Washington and Brussels, according to which Ukraine itself must participate in all talks about the future of Ukraine. Of course, this would not be a problem if the American president conducted these negotiations - which will actually be conducted by his authorized team - from a position of advantage and strength. The question, the answer to which we will have to find out when we eventually see these talks unfold and held, is whether Donald Trump will not be the American head of state who, despite representing the stronger side, voluntarily takes the weaker position.
However, the concessions of the new American administration to Russia are not limited only to the conceptual framework of the negotiations, but also concern their content. In this regard, the words of the head of the Pentagon, Pete Hegseth, delivered yesterday in Brussels at the contact group on Ukraine among the defense ministers of NATO member states are indicative. In his speech, Hegseth stated that "a lasting peace for Ukraine must include solid security guarantees to ensure that the war does not start again". The question is what these security guarantees will be after the US Secretary of Defense rejected two of the three options that promised such measures: Ukraine's membership in NATO or the presence of US forces on the territory of the country as part of a multinational contingent of the Alliance (the third option, offered by Kiev, but probably thrown into space to make the first two options more realistic, was the acquisition/development of nuclear weapons. But the latter is also not an option for the US, since such a move, in addition to not having the political support of the Trump administration, would also be in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Moreover, Hegseth stated that "Europe should provide the majority of future lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine", and if there are peacekeeping forces deployed, they should be composed of "capable European and non-European armed forces". If these words of the US Secretary of Defense are put into practice, this will practically mean no more US military hardware and ammunition for Kiev and no US servicemen to play the symbolic role of a deterrent.
In that case, in what form will the US participate in providing these "solid security guarantees" that the new US administration otherwise announces? In fact, what emerges from the statement of the head of the Pentagon is that the US will lead the negotiations with Russia, and Europe will have to ensure their results. Yes, Pete Hegseth is right, these are not a third version of the Minsk agreements, but not only because they were weak and unprofitable agreements, but also because in them Europe participated in the negotiations (through the Normandy Four, represented by Germany, France and Ukraine), and the US - in sharing the commitments and responsibility.
Yes, it is unrealistic to think that Ukraine can return its occupied lands from Russia, as Pete Hegseth said. The authorities in Kiev are also aware of this, which is why they revised their initial position, according to which they did not plan to participate in negotiations that did not include the restoration of the country's territorial integrity. Unlike Trump, Zelensky is in a weak and losing position. But what was realistic to expect, but has not been realized so far, is for the US administration to declare not only security guarantees for peace (which means such for Ukraine), but also to participate in their materialization. What will be Russia's motivation to comply with any agreement with Ukraine if there is no sanctioning power on the other side (which Europe may be tomorrow, but is not necessarily today)?
Of course, until we see the full scope of the negotiations, it is too early to draw final conclusions. But if these negotiations begin in the way that Washington accepts the format of negotiations desired by Moscow and does not envisage its participation on a bilateral or multilateral basis in providing guarantees for Ukraine’s security, how will they end? Would the US administration make other concessions to Russia: either to Moscow’s demand that Ukrainian forces cede additional territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia, or to the Kremlin’s desire for no cooperation between NATO and Ukraine (will Washington’s refusal to provide military support and/or servicemen as part of peacekeeping forces also be accompanied by a cessation of the provision of intelligence and satellite information, as well as partner training)? Didn't Vladimir Putin win these negotiations before they even began, when the US administration refused to participate in providing guarantees for Ukraine's security and relativized its cooperation with Europe in the field of security and defense ("we are here today to express directly and unequivocally that harsh strategic realities do not allow the United States of America to focus primarily on the security of Europe", in the words of Hegseth)? Is it possible that these talks between Washington and Moscow were conducted so short-sightedly by the US administration, so that they began with the topic of the future of Ukraine and ended with that of Europe?
And most importantly: does Donald Trump really think that he has a reliable interlocutor in the person of Vladimir Putin when it comes to ensuring peace? Vladimir Putin practices "machtpolitik". This is a policy based on power, which is inclined to compromise and peace only if addressed by a greater power, while concessions are interpreted as weakness, which is taken as an invitation to the manifestation of even greater aggression. Stepping on the well-known maxim, also attributed to Plato, George Washington says: to prepare for war, this is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.
Peace is a supreme value in the system of international relations and should be the main goal of reasonable statesmen. But in order for this peace to last as long as possible, it is important under what conditions and with what guarantees of security it is realized. If the conditions are unfavorable and the guarantees are absent, this is not peace, but half-time in war.
"You were faced with the choice between war and dishonor. "You have chosen dishonor, but you will also receive war," Winston Churchill replied to Neville Chamberlain's above-quoted request for peace after the British Prime Minister had concluded an agreement with Hitler.
A year later, World War II broke out and all of Europe had to postpone for years the peaceful sleep promised by Chamberlain. And replace it with a nightmare in which it would wander with its eyes wide open. Because, to paraphrase the well-known thought about hell, the road to war is paved with good intentions.