Since the beginning of the year, relations between the US and Ukraine have been on a negative trend, best summarized on a symbolic level by the clash between Donald Trump (along with his Vice President JD Vance) and Volodymyr Zelensky in the White House last month, and on a practical level - the subsequent suspension of military support, intelligence and satellite information by the Americans towards the Ukrainians. In this downward spiral, marking the communication and cooperation between Kiev and Washington, there were rare exceptions of a positive example - such as the attempt to conclude an agreement on rare earth elements between the two countries. It was at the meeting held between the American and Ukrainian delegations yesterday in Jeddah that the preconditions for a second normalization of relations between them were created.
The results of the negotiations in question speak for such a timid conclusion.
Once, the US resumed its support for Ukraine - military, intelligence, satellite. The price that Kiev had to pay for the lack of such support within the window of its suspension that opened was quickly seen on the ground, where Russia launched serious strikes with drones on various Ukrainian targets, and also managed to put the Ukrainian forces in Kursk under the threat of encirclement. The lack of satellite images prevents the Ukrainian side from having a view of the prepared strikes and movements of the Russian forces.
For the second time, at the meeting in Saudi Arabia, the US and Ukraine agreed on a temporary cessation of hostilities within a 30-day period. What is interesting here is that the idea of such a pause in the conflict was actually more European, articulated in its purest form by the French and the British, for which they also had support from Kiev. Unlike the European proposal, however, which envisaged the cessation of hostilities to be partial (by air, sea and concerning specific infrastructure), the Americans in this case took a larger approach - they are talking about a universal cessation of hostilities, including on land. But more important than the "parenthood" of this idea is that it actually represents a test for Russia - if Moscow really intends for peace, then it should accept the "American" proposal. With it, the Americans are putting pressure not on Ukraine, but on Moscow, for the first time since Donald Trump came to power. Moreover, until now - traditionally from Russia, and recently from the USA - we have heard that Ukraine is the obstacle to peace in the Old Continent.
This positive moment in relations between Kiev and Washington was a function of Ukraine's strategic weakness and the tactical power maneuvers of the USA. For Ukraine to be in a situation of strategic weakness means that it is deprived of the freedom of two essential choices: that between war and peace and that between good and bad peace. Ukraine has no choice in either of these axes, because prolonging the war will further weaken the country's position and will lead to the conclusion of an even more unfavorable peace. In order for Ukraine to be in such a situation, along with reasons of an internal nature for the country, the proverbial weakness of the EU countries to compensate for the vacuums left by the USA in the sphere of security and defense, and the relativization of the partnership between the Old Continent and Washington contributed. In other words, the external factors determining Ukraine's strategic weakness are the deficits of the military-industrial complexes of European countries and the diplomatic priorities of the Americans, which are not connected with ensuring the security of Europe (the latter is part of the new European situation after the re-election of Donald Trump in the USA). Kiev could continue to wage hostilities as long as it had the support of at least one of these two pillars - either the military-industrial complex of European countries, if it were full-fledged, or the sanctioning and firm power of American diplomacy. In this case, Kiev cannot rely on either of the two. And this means that Ukraine has no other choice but that of peace (against the continuation of the war), because the Europeans cannot provide the weapons and ammunition that the Americans can, and that of a bad peace (against a good peace), because the Americans are making a number of diplomatic concessions to the Russians.
The tactical power maneuvers of the US, which together with the strategic weakness of Ukraine led to this positive moment at the meeting in Saudi Arabia, were the temporary suspension of American military-technical support for Kiev and the ongoing parallel negotiations between Washington and Moscow concerning their bilateral relations, without them being tied to the fate of Ukraine. Kiev is faced with a very dangerous situation: at any moment Ukraine can again be left "in the dark" by the Americans, and the bilateral negotiations between the US and Russia will continue to take place regardless of Kiev.
This positive nuance between the Americans and the Ukrainians, of course, can very easily be suspended and both countries can return with renewed force to the downward spiral when beyond the framework of the negotiations - the possible temporary cessation of hostilities as a prelude to the conclusion of peace - they come to their content. In fact, the more difficult part is yet to come, since if in Jeddah Ukrainians and Americans agreed purely conceptually on peace, they are far from having a consensus on what this peace should look like. It is indicative in this regard that even in Saudi Arabia the Americans, although they spoke about security guarantees for Ukraine, did not commit themselves to their participation in their materialization. By security guarantees, Ukraine and Europe continue to understand something different from what the White House thinks, since according to Donald Trump, the presence of American business interests on Ukrainian territory - along with the conclusion of an agreement between Washington and Kiev on rare earth elements - can serve as such guarantees. The meeting, which was held under the auspices of French President Emmanuel Macron yesterday with the participation of the Chiefs of General Staff of 34 countries, including those of Great Britain, Turkey, Japan and Australia, actually shows not only that the Europeans think of peace through direct security guarantees for Ukraine, but also illustrates the dividing line between the Americans and their partners from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (however significant it is that Washington is actually in the trilateral AUKUS security pact with Great Britain and Australia).
However, the materialization of the results of the meeting between the American and Ukrainian delegations in Saudi Arabia depends mainly on Russia's position. At this point, there is still no such proposal in its pure form (although sources close to President Vladimir Putin have already stated that while the Kremlin would not mind hosting the planned meeting with the American special envoy Steve Utikov this week, the Russians find the agreements reached in Jeddah difficult to implement).
From a purely military point of view, since the war in Ukraine is one of exhaustion, which means that initiative and persistence are its key elements, it makes no sense for Russia to accept a temporary cessation of hostilities, since Moscow has both the initiative and the persistence of pressure.
From a political point of view, however, if the Kremlin were to reject the proposal to stop hostilities, this would cause a double problem for Vladimir Putin. First, it would expose Moscow's desire for peace as deeply false. Second, it would strain relations between Washington and Moscow. The latter is especially important, since for Vladimir Putin, positive communication with the White House serves too many purposes, from accelerating the processes of disintegration between the US and the EU, through the lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia, to the rise of Moscow's shares in front of Beijing. Russia attacked Ukraine not only to acquire additional territories and resources, but also to gain new weight in the redistribution of influence in the system of international relations, for which Ukraine was simply a means. Therefore, the dilemma facing Putin in this case looks like this: if in recent years Russia sacrificed its relations with the US in order to achieve success with Ukraine, would it now partially sacrifice its success in Ukraine in order to achieve partial progress with the US.
Moreover, the Kremlin cannot help but appreciate that Donald Trump represents a historic opportunity for the Russians - if there is an American president who would agree to more, in addition to the concessions already made to Moscow, then this person is now in the White House. And if from a military point of view the temporary cessation of hostilities is not in Russia's favor, then its political negotiations with the Americans can quickly compensate for the lost benefits from Russian military pressure, given the Oval Office's previous compliance with the Kremlin. With this administration in the White House, Russia can demand and receive, in addition to Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, which is already a fact, demilitarization of the country and additional territorial concessions for the conclusion of peace. In such a case, Putin can achieve both of his goals at the same time: both to "de-bone" Ukraine and to normalize relations with the United States. If these Russian conditions are accompanied by the Kremlin's other demands - such as the rejection of any European peacekeeping forces on the territory of Ukraine - then this will no longer be just a bad peace, but a capitulation of Ukraine, which will lead to the scaling of the war on the European map.
This is the basic problem: those who can block Russian demands - the USA - do not do so. This creates a palette of good and better options for Russia and bad and worse ones for Ukraine (and Europe).
When writing about the choice between the lesser and the greater evil, Hannah Arendt says that the weakness of the moral argument in favor of the lesser evil is that people who are faced with such a dilemma forget that they have chosen evil after all. Ukraine faces no such danger - it will always remember that it has chosen evil.