If we impromptuly and for convenience call it Operation Pager, what we have seen in the last two days in Lebanon and Syria, where various messaging systems have begun to blare into their holders, has two faces - one is audacious , the other ugly.
One face consists of the achievement of Israeli intelligence to intercept Hezbollah's logistics lines and compromise the communication devices (pagers and portable radios, so-called walkie-talkies) of the terrorist organization in question, turning them from consumer accessories into pocket bombs . This means that Tel Aviv was able to "put a hand" of these devices during the period in which they traveled from the manufacturer to their end user. In addition, the Israeli services carried out their "engineering" in such a way that these devices failed to arouse suspicion when they were received and checked by the end customer, Hezbollah. This is the extraordinary scale and audacity of Operation Pager.
However, the other face of this operation shows us something different. If accessing Hezbollah's communications devices and modifying them into portable explosives was a function of a carefully prepared and professionally executed task, then their activation—i.e. their transformation from static telecommunications accessories into a constellation with a dynamic composition - seems to have been the work of force majeure. This is evidenced by various circumstances.
The most important of them is the operation "Pager" in a military planning context. The temporary or permanent demobilization of a Hezbollah military asset, accompanied by at least the partial destruction of communications connectivity between the organization's various units and the instilling of panic and disorganization, is a factor in itself that should not be underestimated. But it would be significantly more important if it were carried out in parallel (as a separate element of a wider plan) rather than as a single action. For example, if the disabling of between 3,000 and 4,000 thousand mid- and high-echelon fighters of the organization in question was accompanied by a large-scale and complex Israeli military operation against southern Lebanon, then this would paralyze - logistically and psychologically - the reaction to a considerable extent of Hezbollah in the first and key moments of such a war. And whether or not an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon follows, Hezbollah will have had plenty of time to shake off the shock and surprise that is a key element of attack in military planning. That is, operation "Pager" he was far from making the most of the situation.
With a similar conclusion would correspond an extremely spread by the Israeli media, according to which Tel Aviv took this step to activate the "sleeper bombs" after the Israeli cabinet received indications that Hezbollah was close to discovering the compromised devices. In such a case, virtually all Israeli media reported, the government was faced with the following option: settle for a half-empty glass rather than lose it too. And it is here that the real result and evaluation of the operation "Pager" should be sought. - the explosion of Hezbollah's various telecommunications devices, which caused personnel, logistical and moral damage to the Shiite group in question, was not the apogee of the Israeli operation, but actually represented its preventive abortion.
There are other circumstances that rather testify to the fact that operation "Pager" was "pulled" forward in time due to force majeure. If it were up to Israel alone, Tel Aviv would be unlikely to launch such an event while US envoy Amos Hochstein is still in the region (after Israel, his schedule listed Lebanon as the next destination). The purpose of the American's visit to these two countries was to achieve de-escalation between Tel Aviv and Beirut, i.e. the exact opposite of what Israel would achieve by activating an operation like "Pager". If Benjamin Netanyahu did not have to take into account circumstances beyond his control, he would hardly have taken this step against Hezbollah, while the shadow of the special envoy of the American president has not yet cooled on Israeli lands. Such a move would be too offensive for Washington, regardless of the already deteriorating dialogue between Joe Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu.
At the same time, the security sector in Israel has been put under some tension, as the disagreements between Shin Bet and Mossad leaders and the prime minister that surfaced in the media must be added to the expectation that Netanyahu will fire the Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff of the israeli army. Adapted to Operation Pager, this means this: Netanyahu would not put the crown on this type of event, which has the potential to lead the country to full-scale war with Hezbollah (and other pro-Iranian organizations in the region), until he has already the heads of key and power departments convenient for him, such as the head of the Ministry of War and the Chief of the General Staff. And the fact that Netanyahu is willing to risk a war on the northern border with Lebanon under the current cadre means just that: that the gun on the stage has gone off sooner than expected.
There is another indication for the latter. The introduction to a logical conclusion of operation "Pager" in the presence of conventional warfare involving ground action in enemy territory would look one way. However, it acquires a radically different view when force majeure circumstances make the epicenter of its action, either a fruit-vegetable in Beirut, or the mourning processions in the city, when among the victims there are also civilians (hence the critical reactions of the High Representative of the European Union on the issues of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the UN Secretary General). That was the ugliness in Operation Pager.
Meanwhile, Defense Minister Yoav Galant, whose head Netanyahu has been vying for, announced yesterday evening that Israel is entering a new military phase, envisioning Tel Aviv's focus on Hezbollah and Lebanon. The aim here of a possible new military operation is the return of the population along the border areas of Northern Israel, previously deployed along the conflict with the Shia terrorist group. Of course, in this case it is more of a pretext on the part of the Israeli authorities, insofar as the real goal of a possible military intervention against South Lebanon will be to seek the "push out" of Hezbollah north of the border with Israel (at least as far as the Litani River, south of which the Shiite organization's presence is in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701). If it comes to a full-scale conflict, it will be a bold and ugly series, the blood of which will drip from the televisions of the viewers.