Imagine a NATO country like the UK, France or even Germany being attacked by Vladimir Putin while the fighting in Ukraine has stopped. Now imagine a paralysed Alliance, with member states caught between their commitment to help any ally under attack and their public opinion potentially reluctant to intervene in a foreign conflict... In a year, maybe five. Or even sooner: a campaign of assassinations, sabotage and arson will intensify across Europe in the coming months.
This worrying scenario is described by Keir Giles, a leading British researcher on European defence and Russia at the prestigious Chatham House think tank and author of the recent book "Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent, ranked by the Financial Times among the best political books of 2024. In an interview with the French newspaper L'Express, Giles explains why he believes the question is not whether, after Ukraine, Vladimir Putin will launch a new offensive in Europe, but "when". "The countdown has already begun before Vladimir Putin is ready to take action in other parts of Europe," he warns. Which country could he target? Which country could he choose as a target? It is difficult to say exactly; the equation of this choice is a function of many variables. But at a time when "the balance of power is generally favorable to Russia, regardless of the scenario", Keir Giles is pessimistic: "Most European NATO member states are more vulnerable today than they were in February 2022".
L'EXPRESS: In your opinion, it is only a matter of time before the Kremlin launches a new offensive against Europe. Why do you make this prediction?
KEIR GILES: First, Putin has always been relatively clear about his goals in his war against Ukraine: he has never hidden his desire to restore Russia's old borders, when the sovereign and independent nations we know today were still part of the Russian Empire. But most importantly, there is now an unprecedented consensus across NATO, based on very reliable sources of information such as defense ministers, military and intelligence chiefs, that Russia's next target will be one of the Atlantic Alliance's member states. The only diagnosis that not everyone agrees with is how quickly Russia will be ready to take action. Some are betting on a year, others on five... But what is certain is that once the fighting in Ukraine is over, the brakes will be lifted. Why? Simply because as the war continues, Ukraine could destroy Russian ground forces, thus preventing Moscow from rebuilding its forces optimally. Without this buffer zone, Putin's hands will be untied. The countdown has begun before he is ready to take action in other parts of Europe.
L"EXPRESS: What interest could Putin have in attacking a NATO country?
K. GILES: If we assume that Russia has ambitions to reclaim part of its former empire, then the biggest obstacle to achieving that goal will be NATO. Indeed, many former parts of the empire - such as Poland and Finland, and even the Soviet Union, such as the Baltic states, which Putin may want to bring back into his fold - are now part of the Alliance. If one of them is attacked, NATO member states will have to - under its Article 5 - provide a unified response and assistance to the country in danger. Which would put Putin's plans in jeopardy. Therefore, it is in his interest to neutralize this scenario.
L"EXPRESS: How?
K. GILES: This is where Russian military doctrine comes into play, the key element of which is to inflict enough damage on a given target to deter it from engaging in a wider conflict. The easiest way for Putin to prevent NATO from thwarting his plans would be to carry out demonstration strikes on a secondary target. Either on a NATO member country that would be critical to European defense, such as Germany, France, or the United Kingdom. Or on one of NATO's main administrative and military command posts in and around Brussels. Anything is possible.
L"EXPRESS: How would that hinder NATO's response?
K. GILES: Think about the impact that a Russian attack on a member state would have on Western public opinion, which is completely unprepared for such a development because it still believes that war only happens to others. Add to this the fact that civil protection and preparedness for this type of situation are practically non-existent in most of Western Europe. There is no doubt that such an attack would provoke a serious reaction among public opinion. Most countries would probably consider it unimportant or even contrary to their interests to come to the aid of the attacked country. And therefore they could put pressure on their leadership not to enter into conflict.
L" EXPRESS: Some countries, such as Denmark and Finland, seem to be taking measures to strengthen security in certain regions... Wouldn't some countries be more vulnerable than others in the event of a Russian attack?
K. GILES: For now, the balance of power is generally favorable to Russia, regardless of the scenario. On the one hand, the bulk of Russia’s military potential, such as its navy, air force and especially its nuclear forces, has not been affected by the war in Ukraine; and even the most affected ground forces have been rebuilt. By April 2024, they were 15% larger than they were at the start of the war in Ukraine. So Russia is just as strong, if not stronger, than at the start of the war. On the other hand, NATO countries are generally weaker because of the scale of their support for Ukraine. Some have donated entire sectors of their military capacity to allow Ukraine to continue fighting, while failing to invest in replacing their own stockpiles. Indeed, there are some countries in southern Europe that are gradually increasing their defense spending to fill this gap. But nothing compares to the transformative investment we are seeing in Poland. In other countries, notably the United Kingdom, defense spending falls short of the minimum recognized as necessary to maintain a defensive capability.
In short, unlike Moscow, most European NATO members are more vulnerable today than they were in January 2022. And I would go even further: in some ways, the current situation resembles the one that dragged Europe into World War II: an expansionist power seizing parts of a neighboring territory, while other countries, such as Britain and France, have treaty obligations to the country that is in turn about to be attacked. But European countries are in an even worse position today than they were in the 1930s, because there has been no such massive rearmament as allowed the United Kingdom, especially, to survive in 1939 and 1940.
Furthermore, we now have a United States that is ambiguous about the threat, and we do not have the advantage of distance that insulated us from the threat at that time. For although most Europeans calmly believe that war is not their problem, if they look at a globe they will see that Russia can reach any country within missile range, by air or by sea... However, Russia's choice of its next target is an ever-changing equation, because it depends on many variables. It is not just a matter of understanding the evolution of Russia's and its adversaries' military capabilities, but also more abstract factors such as the return on investment that Russia would receive by attacking a given country. Which is somewhat incomprehensible.
L"EXPRESS: Beyond the purely military aspect, how could a Russian attack on a European country manifest itself?
K. GILES: Russia will certainly step up its campaign of assassinations, sabotage and arson across Europe in the coming months. In fact, when the war does not go the way Russia wants, it steps up its campaign of covert and semi-covert attacks on Europe. There are two distinct categories of attacks carried out by Russian proxies across Europe. Some are completely random, such as the arson of shopping malls in Warsaw, an IKEA in Lithuania or a warehouse in London. Others follow a very clear pattern, targeting logistics and communications - for example, cyberattacks and sabotage attacks on railways in Poland, the Czech Republic or Germany. Another way to create chaos is by jamming GPS signals in the Baltic Sea or the Far North. A campaign that is already underway, but if it intensifies, could have consequences not only for air travel but also for ground transport. In short, this type of attack meets the criteria outlined in a 2019 study I co-authored for the Swedish Defense Research Agency on what Russia could do to paralyze Europe before an open conventional attack on one of its countries.
L"EXPRESS: You describe a kind of "denial" on the part of politicians of the real state of war with Russia... Where does this denial come from?
K. GILES: I see a lack of imagination on the part of some of our political leaders. We have seen in many countries a situation where military leaders, but also some senior officials such as ministers of defence or the armed forces, were perfectly aware of the scale of the threat and what had to be done to counter it. But this does not permeate the highest level of political decision-making, whether it is the Chancellor in Germany or the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom. The problem is acknowledged but no action is taken to resolve it because it would be too politically inconvenient. As if re-prioritizing budget priorities poses a greater risk than leaving a country defenceless and potentially facing an existential threat.
L" EXPRESS: If Donald Trump does indeed withdraw the United States from NATO, as he has threatened to do, can "European defence" to confront the Russian threat?
K. GILES: In principle, yes. A united Europe would be strong enough to resist and repel a Russian invasion of a European member state. But without the United States as a guarantor power, it would still be a kind of coalition of countries less willing to confront Russia. And in any case, we saw that even with the full support of the United States, Germany was not particularly eager to offend Moscow. So the question is how many of these countries capable of constituting this Europe of defense would actually recognize their commitments in a scenario where Trump withdraws and Europe is attacked. There is a lot of emphasis on the danger of the US simply withdrawing from NATO, but it is not necessary to go that far to neutralize the alliance's ability to act. As I mentioned, it is enough for public opinion to abdicate its obligations to its country for nothing to happen!
L"EXPRESS: In your book you are cautious about "Trumptism", namely the idea that the new president will ensure lasting peace in Ukraine. Why?
K. GILES: I must say that Trump's recent comments on the possibility of an end to the fighting in Ukraine represent a surprising break with all his previous behavior towards Russian interests. During his first term, there was the transfer of northwestern Syria to Russian forces or the attempt to withdraw American forces from Germany, but also a series of other events... Trump seems less dependent on Moscow and less beholden to Putin. We do not yet know where this will take us. Of course, anyone who has followed American news for some time knows that what Trump says and the orders he gives his administration are not always the same thing. But it seems less certain today than it did before he took office that Trump would try to throw Ukraine under the bus.
L"EXPRESS: At this stage of the war, some are calling for talks with Vladimir Putin. What do you think?
K. GILES: For those who want to talk to Putin, the question is simple: what do they want to offer Putin in the hope that he will go? There is no precedent to suggest that trying to appease him will improve the situation rather than make it worse. In fact, every attempt to appease Putin has led us to the situation we know today, in which the existence of states is at stake because Putin has not been resisted. To preserve peace in Europe, we must learn the lessons of past centuries when peace was made with Russia: namely, with armed forces superior to Moscow's and a visible determination to use them if they are put to the test. Demonstration of power by a state is the only principle that Russia respects and has always respected. And this lesson has been learned, and at great cost, by Russia's neighbors and more distant European powers throughout history.