Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia should have started the war with Ukraine back in 2014, when the ceasefire was signed, instead of waiting until 2022. He expressed this position during his annual televised press conference "Direct Line" on December 19, News.bg reports.
Putin claims that Russia has been systematically preparing for the war and rejects accusations that the invasion in 2022 was “spontaneous“. He justified the attack by Ukraine's refusal to abide by the Minsk II Agreements.
The Minsk II Agreements: Russia's Benefits and Violations
The Minsk II Agreements provided significant advantages to Russia by imposing commitments on Ukraine that limited its sovereignty. They allowed Moscow-backed separatists to hold onto territories they had occupied since 2014 without requiring Russia to withdraw its armed forces. The agreements also reinforced the Russian narrative that the separatists were operating independently of the Kremlin, despite evidence to the contrary.
These arrangements created a "ceasefire" that Russian proxies frequently violated with Moscow's support. Russia is using these positions to prepare for a full-scale invasion in 2022.
Negotiations and Russian demands
Putin has insisted that negotiations with Ukraine be based on the demands of 2022, when Russian troops were on the offensive. He stressed that any future agreements must reflect “realities on the ground” and include requirements such as demilitarization and neutrality of Ukraine.
In March 2022, a draft treaty proposed by Russia stipulated that Ukraine would remain a neutral state, not join NATO, and limit its army to 85,000 soldiers. These conditions are reminiscent of the restrictions imposed on Germany after World War I.
Putin continues to insist on the complete surrender of Ukraine, believing that Russia will prevail militarily and break the will of Kiev and the West.
Realities on the Battlefield
Russian forces have achieved limited success in 2024, with their advances in eastern Ukraine slowing significantly. Despite Putin’s boasts of “square-kilometer progress,” the reality shows heavy Russian losses. In November 2024 alone, Russia suffered an average of 1,523 casualties per day – a new record for the war.
The Ukrainian army, for its part, has managed to liberate significant territories, including Kiev and Kherson, and secure key positions on the front. However, Russia continues to pursue a strategy of “attrition” in the hope of gradually exhausting Ukrainian forces and reducing Western support.
Propaganda and domestic sentiment in Russia
Putin continues to promote the narrative of the illegitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in an attempt to delegitimize the Ukrainian government and justify the war. This rhetoric aims to shift the blame for the lack of peace talks onto Kiev and maintain support for the conflict among the Russian population.
According to surveys, Russian public support for the war is declining, and more citizens are expressing a desire for its end, even with territorial concessions. Nevertheless, Putin continues to emphasize the “high combat readiness” of the Russian army and the role of new weapons such as the Oreshnik missile.
Conclusion: The Way Forward
Putin's current strategy relies on the exhaustion of Ukraine and the West, but its success remains questionable. High casualties, limited military successes, and growing discontent among the Russian population cast doubt on the sustainability of this policy. Western allies continue to play a key role, and their support could determine the outcome of the conflict.