In the specialized literature, Israel exists as a classic example of a state that lacks strategic depth.
The latter means that the country's sparse territory, as well as its often hostile regional context, create the following disproportion: a high coefficient of risks to its national security against a short reaction time and limited possibilities for tactical retreat.
For states that lack strategic depth, every battle has the effect of a final war, i.e. if they lose the battle, they usually lose the war. It is for this reason that Israel began to develop an extraterritorial concept of its security, which aims to secure its own through a form of surveillance (and control) of what is foreign.
For similar reasons, Israel has occupied the Sinai Peninsula, southern Lebanon, and, in various forms and at various times, the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over the years.
This is precisely how Tel Aviv has tried to compensate for its lack of strategic depth, gaining physical space (control over lands that are not Israeli) and time (for reaction). Of course, the deficiencies of Israel's political geography are also compensated by the integration of modern technologies in key sectors such as the military, which allows it to acquire exceptional defensive and offensive capabilities (as we saw in the exchange of strikes between Israel and Iran and in Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon last year).
The integration of modern technologies in the military and intelligence spheres also helps Tel Aviv to carry out preventive strikes - for example, in the so-called "Pagergate" against Hezbollah, as well as strikes against military hardware and chemical arsenals of Syria - as part of the Israeli policy of deterrence against current and potential enemies.
The extraterritorial conceptualization of Israel's security explains Tel Aviv's renewed military activity towards three theaters of action, which we have been observing for days and weeks.
The strikes by the Israel Defense Forces against Hezbollah positions in Lebanon, including in the southern part of the capital of the country in question, which are taking place in violation of the agreement agreed at the end of November last year by France and the US between Israel and the Shiite group in question, aim to further destroy Hezbollah's capabilities for command and control.
The renewal of Tel Aviv's military activity towards Lebanon, as in the case of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, corresponds to another key element of Israel's security concept - the so-called. a decisive victory, the aim of which is to achieve such a success that it will take away both the technical possibility and the psychological motivation of the terrorist organizations in question to carry out new attacks on Israel.
The resumption of the ground offensive and air strikes against the Gaza Strip is also taking place in total violation of the contractual framework between Israel and Hamas from January, initiated at that time by the administrations of Joe Biden and Donald Trump.
This new activity of the Israel Defense Forces envisages the creation of "security zones" (in the words of Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz), as well as the "Morag" corridor between Rafah and Khan Yunis. In fact, this is about two basic goals of Tel Aviv. One is the expansion of the space in Gaza, over which Tel Aviv wants to have complete control over security. Effectively, these are "buffer zones", such as Israel has already created both in northern Gaza and inside the Palestinian enclave along the border with Israel. The other is to create an additional obstacle to Hamas's ability to move within the Palestinian enclave (along with two other corridors with a similar purpose, but located in central and northern Gaza).
In parallel with the periodic strikes on various sites, be they with military hardware or chemical arsenals, as well as the occupation of Syrian territories from the Golan Heights (including Mount Hermon, which provides exceptional strategic advantages), Israel is also trying to create a demilitarized zone in southern Syria.
The goal of the latter is also to expand Tel Aviv's security zone so that the territories in question are not used to carry out attacks on the Israeli state, regardless of whether they come from Sunni or Shiite radical organizations.
But these days we have seen something else: Israeli warplanes are expanding the scope of their operations, also striking air bases in Homs and Hama. This is happening against the backdrop of increasingly insistent media reports that Turkey is keen to increase its military presence there, including formalizing it through military facilities equipped with missile defense.
The application of Israel's extraterritorial security matrix would help to understand the behavior of the state in question, including the cost of violating bilateral agreements, the national sovereignty of individual states and international law, but its full achievement also requires considering a set of subjective factors related to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The resumption of the external enemy, the main role of which is usually reserved for Iran, is a key element in the political survival strategy of the head of the Israeli executive branch.
In fact, the resumption of the war with Hamas and Hezbollah was necessary for Netanyahu, insofar as it consolidated his majority in the Knesset: the party of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich remained in the government, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir also returned to it.
The continuation of the war with Hamas was a condition that Netanyahu's coalition partners in question set for him in order for him to preserve his majority in the Knesset.
The parliamentary majority and the resulting strong executive power are the only defensive wall that Netanyahu has in the face of increasing conflicts between him and various Israeli institutions.
For example, the Israeli Prime Minister's desire to introduce changes to the country's judicial system, which would strengthen the role and importance of the parliamentary majority in its construction, met with resistance not only from the industry in question, but was also the occasion for large-scale civil protests. Netanyahu, himself the subject of various corruption investigations, is in direct conflict with the country's Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, whom he is trying to dismiss.
Contradictions with the prime minister led to the resignation of Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi at the beginning of the year. The dismissal of the head of Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service, Ronen Bar, is related both to differences over the war with Hamas and to the role that the organization in question has in the investigation of individuals close to Netanyahu, who are facing possible charges related to providing classified information to the media and unregulated contacts with third parties (this is the basis of the "Katargate" developing in Israel, which puts the Israeli Prime Minister in the spotlight for an unfavorable reason).
Against this background, the ongoing protests in the country accuse the Israeli Prime Minister of being ready to sacrifice the hostages held by Hamas for the sake of his political survival. In this context, otherwise sharing antagonism, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Benjamin Netanyahu are using each other's image to highlight the external risks for their countries, trying to fend off the ongoing protests against them in Turkey and Israel.
Although its importance should not be underestimated at all, the only support Netanyahu is currently receiving is from US President Donald Trump. The latter, himself angered by Hamas' rejection of his ultimatums to release the hostages, has supported the Israeli prime minister in resuming military action against the terrorist organization in Gaza.
But Benjamin Netanyahu is in a circular defense mode and it seems that he needs the wars he is waging more than Israel. If Tel Aviv's survival implies an extraterritorial thinking of the security of the state in question, then that of the Israeli prime minister is a function of far more subjective assumptions.
And this creates a danger that Israeli strategists are not accustomed to considering: a risk that this time comes not from outside, but from within Israel. And if Tel Aviv has shown that it can wage war on several fronts, we have yet to find out whether this is also within Netanyahu's capabilities.