Hubert Védrine, former French foreign minister and former advisor to President François Mitterrand, has published a "New Dictionary of Geopolitics" to try to "decipher the mess we are in", and in particular Trump's strategy towards Ukraine.
In an interview with the French daily Le Figaro on the occasion of the book's release, he asks more questions than he offers answers, such as: Should Europeans let Trump determine long-term relations with Russia?
LE FIGARO: You are publishing a "new" Dictionary of Geopolitics...
HUBER VEDRIN: I finished revising it after Trump's re-election and added 20 new articles. The original idea remains the same - a return to history and a long-term perspective. The instantaneous, reactive, even hysterical nature of our world means that we no longer understand anything about it. I hope that my book will help to better decipher the mess we are immersed in.
LE FIGARO: There is no chapter on "Zelensky". Don't you consider him a representative of the free world, a courageous president with Churchillian overtones?
Y. VEDRIN: The rhetoric of the 1930s or 1950s does not allow us to understand the modern world. In the article "Ukraine" I talk about Zelensky's courage. After the brawl in the White House, I suggested giving him the award for courage and Donald Trump the award for indignity. But that doesn't change the fact that Trump, who is obsessed with China and for whom the Ukraine problem is secondary, will end the fighting, at least unilaterally. And that there will be a rare earths deal that will make the US interested in the future of Ukraine.
LE FIGARO: Putin resurrected the West. Is Trump killing it?
Y. VEDRIN: Americans and Europeans are actually first cousins. The 20th century was left in parentheses because the US was forced, against the will of George Washington, to intervene in European affairs. Since 1949, Europeans have been protected by the Americans, which has made it possible to talk about a "West". It was more of a patron-mentee relationship than between equal allies. Putin has certainly revived the spirit of defense in Europe, but within the Alliance. I think all of that is over. For Trump, there are no allies, only parasites or commercial competitors. And we no longer share the same values (see Vance's heretical speech in Munich). The most destabilized are the Europeans who believed in happy globalization, in the irreversible practice of diplomatic multilateralism and in another trend - American progressivism, degenerated into Wocksism. But as long as the 1949 treaty and NATO still exist, we can talk about transatlantic ties.
LE FIGARO: Is Donald Trump an ideologue?
Y: VEDRIN: Vance is, Donald Trump is not. Donald Trump has a monstrous ego, a desire for power, revenge, domination and financial greed. But if his policies backfire, he may change his position. For example, if inflation rises again due to the trade war; or when he realizes that the US still needs a lot of immigrants, but much better selected ones; or when he realizes that China will take the lead in the green technologies of the future. In the Middle East, where he is counting on Saudi Arabia to lower the price of oil and renew the Abraham Accords, Trump will not be able to make Riyadh swallow the ethnic cleansing of Gaza. We should expect unexpected turns of events.
LE FIGARO: Will he be able to make progress on the Ukraine-Russia issue?
Y. VEDRIN: Regarding Ukraine, he is doing what he had previously stated, much to our horror and that of the Ukrainians. The question is how to ensure the ceasefire that will follow the cessation of fighting. As for the relationship between the United States and Russia, he seems to have, perhaps unconsciously, the same vision as that of the great American realists who negotiated the disarmament agreements with the USSR, but we do not know how far he will be willing and able to go, nor how Putin will try to exploit this situation. Should Europeans let Trump determine long-term relations with Russia? This question will soon be on the table. Today it is untenable for Europe.
LE FIGARO: What do you think should be done in Ukraine?
Y. VEDRIN: Everything possible to ensure that the ceasefire is as harmless as possible for Ukraine; that the security of its territory (excluding Crimea and Donbas) is guaranteed in a reliable and lasting way. Ukraine must be helped to demine, to rebuild, etc. The answers to these various questions will depend either on the European Union as a whole (the prospect of gradual accession according to the idea of MP Jean-Louis Bourlanges), or on the few European countries of the Alliance with armies.
LE FIGARO: Are Europeans capable of uniting for Ukraine and for European security and defense?
Y. VEDRIN: Several European leaders have stated that they are ready to send troops to Ukraine to guarantee a possible ceasefire. The Russians have already rejected the presence of soldiers from NATO countries. But Trump may need European countries to send troops, in order to prevent his withdrawal from Ukraine from becoming a total fiasco for him. So the outcome will partly depend on the Trump-Putin and Europe-Trump discussion. Then what would be the mandate of these troops? It will depend on what Trump gets or doesn’t get from Russia in the ceasefire agreement, if any. Then other questions will arise: where will these troops be stationed (not necessarily on the ground), how will they be coordinated? And who will make the decisions?
As for the defense of Europe, if Trump forces the Europeans in the Alliance to take up this issue, which they have methodically rejected for 80 years, then it will be necessary to reach an agreement between France, Britain, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden, etc. on the following questions: What forces do we put in this pillar? What type of general staff will exercise military command? And what political power will command this headquarters? Looking back over the past few decades, there is no chance of this working. But the moment is unprecedented. So nothing is impossible anymore.
LE FIGARO: Could Ukraine, which was denied NATO membership, succumb to the temptation of nuclear protection?
Y. VEDRIN: Trump is even more opposed to Ukraine joining NATO than Biden. A nuclear guarantee granted to Ukraine outside NATO would amount to the same thing. That would be a casus belli, the antithesis of Trump's policies. But in some European countries, a debate has begun on nuclear deterrence. On this issue, we must be strict and precise. Nuclear deterrence must be embodied in a single means of deterrence. President Macron regularly reminds us of this. No nuclear-armed country thinks otherwise. And there is a completely different debate on the level of protection. Britain will not be able to join this discussion because its nuclear weapons are under a double lock with the United States.
In France, the debate has already begun, especially after the unprecedented statements of the potential new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Nuclear weapons protect the national sanctities and vital interests of the country, which are deliberately never specified (except in vague phrases about the European dimension of French deterrence). If this strategic revolution were to be carried out, which country or which interests would be covered by this protection? Will the French take this risk of being on the front line? And above all, will the potential aggressor be convinced and accordingly dissuaded? At this stage, I think that the ambiguity about vital interests remains more of a deterrent than their clarification, but, as I said, we live in unprecedented times.
LE FIGARO: Why does Europe so lack leaders of the rank of Churchill?
Y. VEDRIN: We cannot wish for a new world war to give birth to Churchills, Roosevelts, De Gaulles (and Stalins!). In modern, ahistorical democracies, where mandates are short, surveillance and harassment on social networks are constant, there is a risk that followers will outnumber leaders. But remember that Churchill was considered finished before he was summoned by King George V, and Truman was considered a simple store owner in Kansas City. He did, however, take the historic decisions of the post-war period (the "Marshall" Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, the containment of the USSR, NATO). Let's not be too quick to judge - the coming weeks will be truly historic.
LE FIGARO: Do you think the EU could fall apart?
Y. VEDRIN: No. I think that if Putin wanted to attack NATO, he would not wait for it to rearm, strengthen and mobilize again. But, since I cannot prove it, I strongly support the idea of creating in Europe a kind of military "barb", discouraging any aggression, led by the European pole that I spoke about. In the trade and economic sphere, it is absolutely necessary for the European Union (where it is competent) to resist Trump's attacks until the contradictions in its system force it to correct its positions. It must be able to maintain its regulatory capacity if it implements its brand new anti-bureaucratic orientation and continues the ecological transition. Which implies opposing Trump or bypassing him (in alliance with the Chinese), but above all convincing the European population.
LE FIGARO: Are you, like some people, afraid of the risk of war? How can it happen?
Yu. VEDRIN: I do not see the spiral of events that would lead to a general war. Local clashes - yes, undoubtedly. But let's not forget that we have experienced several decades of threats of destruction between the East and the West, and that the Cold War never turned into a hot one. In any case, before rethinking the global system for managing all this (including relations with the "global South", while avoiding a repetition of the catastrophic mistakes of the United States towards the Russia of Yeltsin, Putin I and II, and Medvedev, in the ten to fifteen years after the end of the USSR), it is necessary, let us repeat, for European leaders to wring from Trump real guarantees for the continuation of the ceasefire in Ukraine and to form, through a coalition, a European pole of the Alliance, restoring the deterrent balance of power in Europe.