A head-on collision on the eastern front! Kiev urgently needs a new war plot

The Kursk offensive offers a new strategy for defeating Ukraine — but it will require the West to change some policies, writes Raphael S. Cohen, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Air Force Project, for Foreign Policy. of the Rand Corporation.

All wars have simple strategic plots. During the American Civil War, there is the Anaconda Plan" of the Union to stifle the Confederacy, and later the "March to the Sea" (to William T. Sherman) to cut what was left in two. During World War II, US strategy centered on "Europe First" as well as the principle of the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. During the Vietnam War, the guiding mantra of the United States was "search and destroy". In Iraq the phrase is "clear, hold, build".

And that's exactly the kind of easy-to-understand plan that Ukraine has been missing for the past year. Two and a half years after the start of full-scale war, Kiev is in desperate need of its own slogan. Now he has an opportunity to get it.

"In the first year of the war, Ukraine was a direct protagonist. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was an unlikely hero, but after Russia attacked, he became a warlord. His famous response when the United States offered to evacuate him from Kiev - "I need ammunition, not taxis" - couldn't be better even if it was written by a Hollywood screenwriter. But as important as the messages are, Ukraine also has a clear - but simple - theory about how to win the war. First, it stopped the Russian advance on Kiev. After that, he defeated the Russian forces around Kharkiv and took back Kherson," the material states.

With weapons made in Western Europe entering Ukraine, a counteroffensive was expected in the spring of 2023 that would at least bring Russia to its borders, if not end the war. But that last step never materialized, not least because months of Western hesitancy to provide critical weapons such as tanks and aircraft gave Russia the time it needed to complete massive frontline fortifications.

"When the 2023 counteroffensive failed, Kiev lost not only troops and equipment. He also lost convincing arguments about how he intended to win. The lack of a convincing argument was not only a PR challenge for Kiev, it also jeopardized future military aid from the West. Western observers increasingly saw Ukraine as engaged in a protracted war of attrition against a larger and more powerful Russia - which also became the Kremlin's new storyline after the first storyline (quick collapse of Kiev and establishment of a Russian gubernia) was exposed as illusory," the post also says.

After that, the West thought that this was a war that Ukraine was unlikely to win. That narrative, in turn, has fueled growing skepticism in Washington and other Western capitals about whether military aid to Ukraine is still a good investment.

Arguably, the charge that the Russo-Ukrainian war has reached a stalemate was never quite accurate. While most of the Western media's attention has focused on the stalemate on the front, Ukraine has seen a number of less visible but perhaps equally important achievements, including pushing Russia's once-vaunted Black Sea Fleet out of Crimean ports and the western Black Sea sea. This is a significant feat for a country without a navy.

Moreover, Ukraine's lack of military progress is at least partly due to the months-long suspension of US and European aid, as well as strict red lines restricting the use of any Western weapons to attack Russian airfields, bases and other military facilities. territory.

"These delays, some of which continue today, meant that Ukraine risked getting bogged down in a kind of strategic quicksand. To get more military aid, it had to prove it had a chance to win by demonstrating significant results on the battlefield — but it had to do so without violating strict restrictions on the use of American and other Western weapons. At the same time, significant battlefield victories, especially against a Russian army that was training and rearming, required even greater supplies of Western military aid and even bolder tactics. Ukraine found itself facing a vicious chicken-and-egg dilemma that did not lead to anything good," the author writes.

And suddenly Ukraine starts an operation in the Kursk region. While this counteroffensive comes as a surprise to many, including US Defense Department officials, it makes perfect sense.

"After all, Ukraine had to do something big. It had to show that although the Russian army is huge, it is still uneven and fragile in places. Ukraine also proved that despite the hand-wringing by the West, and especially the US, about threats of nuclear escalation that have characterized the Kremlin's threats of war from the start, Putin is not as eager to use his nuclear arsenal as those threats suggest , for many reasons. Therefore, these threats should not be a reason for the US to impose severe restrictions on Ukraine's conventional military operations. In other words, Ukraine had to do something loud and show - once again - that it can win," Cohen wrote.

Also, Ukraine had to deliver good news after years of destruction and bloodshed to its own population as well.

"The Kursk offensive gives the Ukrainians what they needed - a strategic realignment," the article notes.

But while the Kursk offensive is the first step, Ukraine will have to offer more if it is to maintain the momentum it now enjoys. Perhaps most importantly, she must find a new strategic line of conduct.

"Ukraine's leaders must convince both their voters at home and their supporters abroad that they have a plan to win the war.

Judging by Ukraine's actions, the country's new, still unformed strategic slogan seems to consist of three relatively well-defined parts: survival, strike and conquest. The first part - survival - focuses on countering Russia's punitive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure and halting the slowly advancing Russian offensive in the Donbass. The second is to strike military and industrial targets deep inside Russia to weaken not only Russia's military potential, but also to increase the economic and political costs to the Putin regime of the war. The third and final part is the "Conquest" section, which includes Kursk. This operation emphasizes capturing Russian territory along the border, possibly both as a buffer to protect Ukrainian territory from Russian aggression and as a potential bargaining chip later,” according to Raphael S. Cohen.

Ultimately, all three elements are necessary, but probably insufficient, to build a new theory of Ukraine's victory, the author writes. It will undoubtedly increase pressure on Moscow, but these elements alone are unlikely to allow Ukraine to regain lost territory as Russia continues to advance in eastern Ukraine despite Ukraine's Kursk offensive.

Nor will future strikes and the seizure of Russian territory dramatically increase domestic pressure on Putin to the point where he would end the war.

"Most Ukrainian analysts I've spoken to admit that most Russians, especially those with influence in Putin's autocracy, simply don't care enough about Kursk to get Putin to abandon his military goals. That leaves the question of what, if any, the next and final element of Ukraine's victory theory might be. In essence, Ukraine has two main options - capitulation or appeasement (to Russia). In the first case, she may hope that the mounting pressure on Putin's regime will eventually cause it to collapse under its own weight," the text states.

But betting on Putin's collapse is by no means guaranteed, and even then it's not necessarily that whoever comes after the Kremlin leader will end the war.

Alternatively, Ukraine could seek a solution to the conflict. By increasing the pain for the Putin regime with the Kursk offensive and continuing to strike deep into Russian infrastructure, Ukraine could pressure Putin to change its cost-benefit calculus and back down from its maximalist demands. Kiev could then trade captured Russian territory for Ukrainian territory captured by Russia.

"In some ways, this approach seems simpler. Ukraine has already inflicted considerable damage on Russia and could almost certainly increase it, especially if the West lifts restrictions on the use of its weapons and other red lines." "Kursk" also showed that Ukraine could seize Russian territory. "The question is whether it can capture enough territory and, just as importantly, hold it, to achieve enough influence to take back all Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine," Cohen added.

In the end, Ukraine will have to choose what the motto of its war will be - "survive - strike - change - submit” or "survive - strike - change - settle".

"And maybe it will be something else entirely. After all, it is the Ukrainians who are bearing the brunt of this war. And then it will be up to Ukraine's supporters in the US and around the world to provide it with the resources and political space to carry out this plot. The good news is that the main idea of the plot - a modern-day David fighting Goliath in the battle between liberal democracies and a united bloc of revanchist autocracies - remains as convincing as ever, the author continues.

But the US presidential election is approaching, and there are more and more challenges around the world. And the Ukrainian leadership must tell its partners and allies - as well as its own public - how it will win.

"If not for the West, then certainly for the Ukrainians themselves," summarizes Raphael S. Cohen.