The UK, Finland and the Czech Republic announced several immediate and long-term military aid packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said that London would provide a package worth about $2.5 billion, mainly to purchase air defense systems and finance defense production in Ukraine.
Finnish Defense Minister Antti Haakkanen announced that his country would provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military aid worth almost 200 million euros. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky said on January 31 that the Czech government is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.
This is according to another analysis of the fighting in Ukraine by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Russian forces have stepped up offensive operations north of Kupyansk, especially near Dvorichna, as part of this broader intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova and Liman directions. Geolocated footage released on January 30 and 31 shows them advancing slightly north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River), into the southern outskirts of Zapadno (southwest of Dvorichna), and advancing north along the west bank of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlinsk (northeast of Dvorichna).
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported on January 28 and 31 that they had recently captured Dvorichna, and a Russian blogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces had captured Novomlinsk.
However, ISW has not found any confirmation of these claims.
Russian forces have carried out five company-sized mechanized attacks and at least one reduced battalion mechanized attack in the direction of Kupyansk since late October 2024.
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion drones operating in the Kupyansk direction, stated on January 28 that since January 22 alone, Ukrainian forces have repelled four attacks from an unspecified echelon.
The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority front areas, and the increased mechanized activity may mean that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a priority sector for Russian forces.
The pace of Russian offensive operations along this section of the front has generally been much slower than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine for most of 2024, and Russian units in the area are likely well-rested and prepared to launch a months-long campaign for Kupyansk. The Russian army does not appear to have significant unused reserves to direct to this effort, but the Russian military command may be prepared to deploy front-line units from another sector of the front to exploit any significant tactical gains in the Dvorichna-Kupyansk area.
Russian forces in this sector have advanced to the east (left) bank of the Oskil River, but have so far struggled to cross the river. The Russian advance across the Oskil River and the further Russian advance in the Dvorichna area are a necessary first step in the Russian effort to envelop Kupyansk from the northwest and southwest. The Oskil River, however, will likely continue to limit further Russian advances west of Krukhlyakovka.
The capture of Avdeevka by the Russian Central Group of Forces in February 2024 was Russia's first relatively successful encirclement since Russian forces regained the initiative across the theater in the fall of 2023. and Russian forces spent four months closing a gap 12 to 15 kilometers wide and eventually forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw under threat of tactical encirclement. The capture of Avdiivka likely served as a blueprint for the Russian military command for future encirclements in other front lines. The Russian Eastern Group of Forces' effort to capture Ugledar successfully forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Ugledar, and Russian forces captured the village in October 2024.
Elements were then able to capitalize on the capture of Ugledar, advance further west, and block Ukraine's exit routes to encircle and capture Velika Novosilka in January 2025.
Russian forces have managed to close smaller encirclements around Ugledar and Velika Novosilka, but ongoing Russian efforts to conduct larger encirclements around Pokrovsk and Kupyansk will test the extent of Russian capacity.
The Russian military command also appears to be experimenting with incorporating multiple military districts. It achieved significant tactical successes through sweeps in the Ugledar and Velika Novosilka directions in the fall of 2024 and early winter of 2024-2025, likely in part due to keeping these two operational efforts under a single command—the Eastern Group of Forces. Having a single command in both directions likely helped minimize coordination problems and provided a cohesive and unified vision for operational-level planning in the area.
The Russian Central Group of Forces is currently monitoring the Pokrovsk area from the northeast and southwest, consolidating tactical advances near Vozdvizhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Kotline (southwest of Pokrovsk) into an arc around Pokrovsk and Mirnograd, closing a gap that is currently 30 kilometers wide.
The Russian Army's ability to replicate this method across multiple military districts is remarkable and demonstrates that the Russian General Staff can improve its ability to disseminate lessons learned across multiple sectors of the front line. Russian forces have previously failed to learn and apply lessons learned across their areas of responsibility, resulting in costly losses of troops and armored vehicles along the entire front line over the past three years.
Russian forces have historically been more adept at absorbing and applying lessons across units within a single force grouping/military district, but the ability of Russian forces to undertake an encirclement in the direction of Kupyansk, modeled after Russian activity in the Donetsk region, indicates that the Russian General Staff is at least attempting to disseminate lessons learned and possibly new doctrine across the theater.
The Russian military command has shown itself willing to commit to operations that could take six to nine months to complete. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no intention of ending the war in Ukraine in the near future. Russian forces have been working gradually to push Ukrainian forces from the east bank of the Oskil River since the winter of 2023–2024, and the Russian military command has previously deprioritized the Kupyansk-Borova-Liman line in favor of other operational efforts in Ukraine.
The encirclement of Kupyansk will almost certainly be a months-long effort, requiring Russian forces to close a gap 25 to 30 kilometers wide while simultaneously crossing and maintaining logistics across the Oskil River, capturing small settlements along the way, and repelling Ukrainian counterattacks. Mashovets and a Russian blogger suggested that the Russian military command may intend to use the advances near Dvorichna and Vovchansk to advance towards Velikiy Burluk from the northwest and southeast.
Russian forces are currently 30 and 35 kilometers from Velikiy Burluk from their closest advance point in the directions of Kupyansk and Vovchansk, respectively, and Russian forces could spend six months to a year in a slow, tortuous advance towards Velikiy Burluk before they truly threaten the settlement.
Russian commanders do not seem concerned about the speed or consistency of their advance in Ukraine, probably because they believe that the war will drag on until Russia defeats Ukraine militarily. The Russian military spent four months capturing Avdiivka, spending most of 2024 in work to level the front line in western Donetsk region and have devoted the last three years to capturing the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but does not seem particularly concerned with accelerating these advances.
Putin has previously formulated a theory of victory that suggests that the Russian army will be able to continue its gradual, creeping advance into Ukraine indefinitely, and has repeatedly indicated that he has no interest in resolving the war on any terms other than those he dictates.
Putin's commanders are internalizing these statements and likely drawing the logical conclusion that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he achieves his goals in Ukraine, which are the overthrow of the current Ukrainian government and the outright destruction of the Ukrainian military.
This Russian offensive method results in slow operational maneuvers on the battlefield, but these ranges require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment, and do not replace rapid, mechanized maneuvers on the battlefield. The recent encirclement of Russian forces has shown that these efforts require significant numbers of personnel, armor, and artillery systems to maintain the pace of advance. The personnel and vehicle losses that Russia is incurring to achieve this creeping, incremental advance are unsustainable, given Russia's current generation of armed forces and defense industry capacity. Reports of Russian tank and armored vehicle losses in 2024 show, for example, that such losses are likely to be unaffordable in the long term, especially as Russia continues to deplete its limited Soviet-era stockpiles.
The current monthly recruitment rate in Russia is also likely either exactly equal to or below the amount needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one, but there are reports that select Russian regions are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.
Russia's ability to continue to slowly envelop populated areas, rather than attempting to conduct rapid mechanized maneuvers that would penetrate Ukraine's defense lines and quickly make significant operational advances, in the medium to long term depends on Russia's ability to deliver the large quantities of personnel and equipment needed to sustain these operations.
Russian forces are also stepping up efforts to close in on the remaining Ukrainian territory west of Kurakhovo. Geolocated footage released on January 30 shows that Russian forces recently advanced north of Sukhyi Yali (southwest of Kurakhovo) in a motorized assault, likely collapsing the southern part of the Ukrainian pocket along the Zelenivka-Sukhyi Yali-Yantarne line.
Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities have agreed to accept a package from the European Union (EU) for the purchase of gas for Transnistria, further limiting Russia's economic influence over the pro-Russian breakaway republic. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recan said on January 31 that they had reached an agreement to accept a package worth a total of 64 million euros.
€20 million will go to purchase gas, while another €10 million will go to Moldova to purchase electricity. The EU will also give Moldova €34 million to support its federal budget. The Russian business publication "Kommersant" reported on January 30 that unspecified sources said that Transnistria would use funds allocated by the EU to purchase gas on the European market from February 1 to 10 through Moldovan state-owned electricity company Energocom, which Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz would then supply to Transnistria.
Sources to "Kommersant" said that Transnistria intends to use Russian funding to purchase gas from a Hungarian company that has not yet been identified, starting February 11. Transnistria’s acceptance of EU aid greatly worsens Russia’s economic influence over Transnistria, as free supplies of Russian gas for the Transnistrian power plant supported electricity exports, which supported the Transnistrian budget.
Russian and pro-Kremlin authorities in Transnistria are likely to try to play up Russia’s role in providing Transnistria with limited funding for gas purchases since mid-February to promote Russia as Transnistria’s benefactor and savior. EU funding for Moldovan electricity purchases is also likely to worsen the efficacy of Russian anti-European narratives, especially those about Moldova’s shift to higher-priced European electricity, ahead of Moldova’s parliamentary elections in the summer of 2025.
Ukrainian forces have struck a Russian oil refinery in the Volgograd region amid ongoing strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 31 that elements of the Main Directorate of Military Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR), unmanned systems forces, and other Ukrainian forces struck the "Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka" oil refinery in the city of Volgograd on the night of January 30-31, causing an explosion in the area.
The head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, reported on January 31 that the "Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka" oil refinery is the sixth largest oil refinery in Russia.
Volgograd regional governor Andrey Bocharov said on January 31 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil refinery in the region.
A Russian internal source has released footage showing an explosion near the oil refinery. Ukrainian forces previously struck the oil refinery in February and May 2024.