Exploring weaknesses and then - a quick attack - the tactic behind Ukraine's new "Kursk" operation, writes Deisvid Ex in an article for Forbes, reported FOKUS.
Two days after Ukrainian mechanized forces counterattacked in western Russia's Kursk region, taking advantage of the "operational pause" of Russian and North Korean troops in the area, the leading units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are holding on to new positions around the village of Aanaseevka, 4.8 km east of their original lines.
In the third year of Russia's wider war against Ukraine, with drones everywhere at all times and a shortage of modern armored vehicles on both sides, a one-day advance of nearly 5 km is impressive. To get this far and this fast, the Ukrainians appear to have used the same tactics that the Russians have used in their most successful attacks - but with a twist.
It is far from clear whether the Ukrainian infantry will be able to hold on to Afanasyevka. Their positions in the forest outside the village have been under constant bombardment by Russian drones and artillery for two days. “There is still a chance to quickly push the enemy out,” a Russian military blogger reported in a message translated by the Estonian analyst WarTranslated.
But to get this far, the Ukrainians did what Russians usually do: they probed the Russian lines for weak spots and then deployed fast-moving groups of armored vehicles to move the infantry to new positions beyond the initial line of contact. Whether the Ukrainians can consolidate their advance depends on whether more infantry can arrive quickly enough to defend against Russian counterattacks.
Once consolidated, the Ukrainian Armed Forces "may attempt a new attack to build on their success," the blogger warns.
The "probe-attack" tactic, led by infantry but aided by fast-moving vehicles, has been perfected by the Russian armed forces, and Ukrainian mines, drones, artillery and anti-tank missiles have made massed mechanized attacks impractical, if not suicidal.
The Russians, who have a three-to-one or more manpower advantage in many sectors of the front, tend to send small groups of infantry into the Ukrainian lines, apparently assuming that most of the scouts will be killed, but apparently hope that a few of them will find gaps in the Ukrainian defenses.
"Infantry is the first to be used", notes the Royal United Services Institute in London. "As teams are destroyed by defensive fire, Russian forces will send successive teams forward along the same line of approach. The AFU must continually defend its positions against successive waves, expending ammunition, revealing the location of its defensive positions, and exhausting its personnel."
If Russian manpower outweighs Ukrainian firepower, the Russians can take control of the weakened Ukrainian positions.
The main difference between the Russian and Ukrainian versions of this attack tactic is that the Russians have an abundance of troops, while the Ukrainians do not. So the Ukrainians must employ some other approach to probing Russian lines before the main attack.
Ukraine's advantage in drones certainly helps, but the presence of Ukrainian special operations teams near the most successful Ukrainian attacks may also suggest another Ukrainian advantage, allowing for probing operations that are not virtual suicide for the scouts.
The 73rd Special Operations Center of the Ukrainian Navy - basically Ukrainian Navy SEALs - is located in Kursk, near the launch pad of the recent counterattack on Afanasyevka. The center's mission, it is said, is to “collect important intelligence on enemy forces“.
Highly trained Ukrainian commandos have a better chance of surviving a risky reconnaissance mission than untrained Russian conscripts who may have signed their conscription contracts just weeks earlier. This would make Ukrainian attacks less expensive than Russian ones, a necessity for the Ukrainian army, which is constantly struggling to mobilize enough soldiers.
In fact, the lack of manpower could thwart the counterattack in Afanasyevka. “There is only one drawback to the operation,“ the Russian blogger believes. “Positions that were formally “secured“ but lacked enough soldiers (or none at all) are instantly lost“.