The system of international relations is in the process of being parceled out, in which soft coalitions they are increasingly consolidating within themselves, homogenizing into separate blocks. The conclusion of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and North Korea, which contains a defensive element for the provision of mutual assistance if one of them is the object of aggression from a third country, is an example in this direction. The basis of this cooperation in East Asia is the shared value foundation of authoritarian anti-Americanism: the formation of a dictatorial axis whose first and foremost goal is to preserve its own power, opposing what Moscow and Pyongyang understand as liberal interventionism. Beyond ideological cohesion, however, cooperation between Russia and North Korea has technical and pragmatic parameters that are no less important.
What does Vladimir Putin gain from Kim Jong-un?
North Korea is only one of two countries (the other being Iran) that provide weapons to Russia in its war against Ukraine. According to information from Seoul, in the period after the previous meeting between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, which took place last September in the Russian Far East, Moscow received between 3 and 5 million artillery shells from Pyongyang. Although Russia's military-industrial complex is operating at full speed and is constantly increasing its production volume - according to the assessment of the consulting firm Bain & Company Moscow produces artillery shells three times faster and four times cheaper than the collective West does - so North Korean ammunition is still needed for the needs of Russian forces on the Ukrainian front. Along with artillery shells, Pyongyang supplies Moscow with short-range ballistic missiles.
From a conceptual point of view for Russia, however, North Korea has a much more important role: Pyongyang is a military-political barrier that must protect Russia's backyard, the Far East, from the proceeds of a hypothetical resurgence of Japanese militarism and from South Korean capitalism, whose common denominator, according to Moscow, is Washington. Here, however, is one of the differences in perceptions between Russia and China: if for the former the ecstatic behavior of Kim Jong-un is welcome, for the latter it is a cause for risk, insofar as the radicalism of the North Korean dictator provokes, on the other hand, a deepening military partnership between Washington and Seoul and Tokyo.
What does Kim Jong-un gain from Vladimir Putin?
Known as the "hermit kingdom", North Korea is a heavily sanctioned country with severely restricted access to even basic goods and services. Although China remains Pyongyang's main trading partner, Moscow is also a source of food and hydrocarbons. However, it remains an open question whether Russia is supplying North Korea with military technology intended to develop Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic programs (and this also applies to Kim Jong-un's satellite program, since launching satellites into orbit is also part of rocket engineering). Again, according to information coming from South Korea, Moscow helped Pyongyang successfully launch the Malligyong-1 intelligence satellite in November last year. If so, it would be another point of contention between Russia and China, to the extent that Beijing could control the information provided to Pyongyang acquired by Chinese intelligence satellites. Along with Putin's current visit to the East Asian country, however, a new element concerning their military-technological partnership is also being discussed: the possibility of the Russians helping North Korea develop technology intended for nuclear submarines (last year the regime in Pyongyang put into operation "Kim Kun Ok", a modified Soviet Romeo-class submarine that has a diesel-electric engine, but is equipped with ballistic and cruise missiles, it is not clear whether these are equipped with nuclear warheads).
Beyond Russia supplying North Korea with food, hydrocarbons and possibly military technology (the latter would be in violation of relevant UN resolutions supported at the time by both Moscow and Beijing), Vladimir Putin is also providing diplomatic protection to Kim Jong- Univ. The latest example in this direction came from the end of March this year, when within the framework of the UN Security Council, Russia imposed a veto on the activities of the organization's expert commission, whose purpose is to monitor the implementation of sanctions against North Korea (then 13 countries voted "for" the continuation of the commission's activities, and China abstained). In addition, although Pyongyang will remain highly dependent on Beijing, the development of an additional volume of relations with Russia - the text of the concluded comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries is not publicly available, but according to the statements of the two leaders, it concerns the widest possible range of sectors - will allow the North Korean dictator to speculate to the Chinese authorities with additional options, driving up the price.
Russia and North Korea: the context
To be understood objectively, the Russian president's visit to North Korea must be put into context. First of all, it is happening against the background of the escalation of tensions between North and South Korea (the 2018 agreement between the two countries to reduce tensions between them has long been in the trash can, and on the demilitarized zone that separates them again " current" tension and provocations). Secondly, in the last one year, South Korea and Japan have increased the volume of their partnership with the US (in its purely military dimension, two US nuclear submarines, Michigan (SSGN-727) and Missouri (SSN-780) arrived in South Korea last year, and the US B-1B strategic bomber also took part in joint military exercises with Seoul and Tokyo). Thirdly, although the authorities in Seoul deny this, there is growing information that South Korean projectiles are being used to fill the military-industrial deficits of countries supporting Ukraine (since South Korean law prohibits the provision of military products to countries in conflict, the hypothesis is that Seoul provides ammunition to the US and other countries so that they can provide theirs for Kiev's needs). In this sense, Russia and North Korea follow their own logic, according to which the US is the main source of risk for their power architectures, which further brings the two countries closer together.
The balance: a horse for a hen
Vladimir Putin's first visit to North Korea in 24 years was certainly accompanied by a lot of stage fright on the part of the hosts and with frank propaganda kitsch. But it has served both leaders mutually: with Kim Jong-un, the Russian president heals his loneliness, and with Vladimir Putin, the North Korean dictator feels important. However, the need for the Kremlin chief to stop in North Korea, albeit on his way to Vietnam, is indicative of the narrowed strategic options facing Moscow since the start of the war in Ukraine. It is they who make it so that Russia is ready to trade a horse for a chicken (natural resources, sensitive military technology and diplomatic protections against munitions, the operational applicability of which remains debatable). Moscow would hardly agree to such a "deal" if its needs in relation to the war against Ukraine did not force it to make such compromises. And if for North Korea Russia remains a significant geopolitical asset, then for Moscow - as for any other country that decides to put its eggs in Kim Jong-un's basket - Pyongyang seems to promise more risks than benefits. The latter is one of the reasons why China, despite providing the economic existence of the "hermit kingdom", always looks to maintain a healthy distance from North Korea, so as not to allow Kim Jong-un to involve the Celestial Empire in any adventure . However, Beijing has a significant amount of economic relations with South Korea and Japan and simply has a lot to lose, unlike North Korea and Russia.
If the Kremlin deepens its military partnership with Pyongyang and revises its policy "for" denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as advocated by China, the United States and the international community in general, this will mean that Putin is ready to play va bank. Interestingly, this is a kind of "North Koreanization" of Russian foreign policy. The latter poses a risk primarily to South Korea and Japan, but also to China. If North Korea has two pistons, it is the Celestial Empire that usually puts the brakes on Kim Jong-un, while Russia is now pushing the gas on the North Korean dictator.