An analysis of the latest developments in the war in Gaza and its possible outcomes, prepared by the military analyst of the most widely read Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Amos Harel, who presents an insider's view (from Israel) of this old and intractable conflict. The material is published in the leading American foreign policy journal Foreign Affairs.
Just two months after committing to a phased ceasefire with Hamas, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resumed his country's war in the Gaza Strip. On March 18, Israeli air force planes attacked military targets, killing more than 400 Palestinians, including over 300 women and children, according to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry—a devastating toll even by the war's earlier standards.
The short-lived truce allowed the release of 30 hostages taken by Hamas during the October 7, 2023, strike on Israel, as well as the repatriation of eight deceased prisoners. Last week, the Israeli government offered to renew the ceasefire in exchange for the return of 11 more hostages and 16 more bodies.
But even if Hamas and Israel reach a new short-term agreement to halt hostilities, Gaza is unlikely to see real peace anytime soon.
Since the horrific massacre of October 7 that claimed the lives of some 1,250 Israelis, Netanyahu has pursued two goals with his military operations in the Strip: the release of all hostages and the destruction of Hamas. But these goals cannot be achieved simultaneously: Hamas refuses to join a peace process that involves its own destruction, and while Israel is committed to that outcome, the surviving Hamas leaders have a powerful incentive to hold hostages to deter Israeli attacks that could kill them.
This means that even if the ceasefire resumes, Hamas is likely to delay releasing all hostages, Israel is likely to find ways to avoid going through phases that allow Hamas to retain power, and any deal could again fall apart in its final stages. Netanyahu increasingly believes that launching military action pays off. The use of force ultimately weakened Iran and severely crippled its Lebanese militia, Hezbollah.
And while former U.S. President Joe Biden’s team has tried to rein in Israeli escalations, Netanyahu has a more sympathetic ally in President Donald Trump. In a sign of the closeness between the two leaders — and the importance to Netanyahu of maintaining his friendship with Trump — the Israeli prime minister rushed to Washington on Sunday to see Trump for the second time in three months. Emboldened, the Israeli military has meanwhile proposed a sweeping plan to reoccupy Gaza, and Netanyahu’s far-right allies have been even more adamant in proposing the expulsion of most Gazans.
It remains somewhat unclear, however, whether Netanyahu is ready to fulfill his political partners’ wildest dreams. He must consider Trump’s position, however volatile, and whether the Israeli military is in a position to launch a costly, long-term operation in Gaza. For now, the Israeli prime minister’s best option is probably to pursue a middle path that keeps his options open and keeps his allies convinced that he is on their side—and that middle path includes continuing operations in Gaza.
When Israel launched the war in Gaza 18 months ago, there was near-unanimous agreement among Israelis that Hamas must be eliminated. But it soon became clear that Israel’s two military goals—freeing the hostages and destroying Hamas—could not be achieved in the same timeframe. Even assuming that it were possible to eradicate Hamas, a terrorist guerrilla organization that still commands significant support among the people of Gaza, it would take years.
The Israeli hostages, however, have no such time. According to an analysis by The New York Times, 41 hostages died in captivity between October 2023 and early March 2025. Some died of starvation, disease and murder, while others died accidentally as a result of Israeli military operations. These hostages, who returned to Israel from Gaza in recent months, described being held in extremely harsh conditions: many were kept chained in tunnels with little food and no medical care, and some reported experiencing torture.
Because Israel has not clearly prioritized one goal over the other, it has yet to achieve either. Since the war began, Israel has killed most of Hamas’s top leaders, including the group’s Gaza chief, Yahya Sinwar. But the organization still has a leadership structure, and to discourage Israeli attempts to kill them, its remaining leaders are seeking to maintain a human shield—a kind of insurance policy—in the form of a small number of hostages, mostly soldiers. Such an agreement is unacceptable to Netanyahu. For him, only two options are on the table: Hamas’s complete surrender and the expulsion of its leadership from Gaza, or continuing the war until the Israeli military achieves the same result. In the second scenario, he would likely blame Hamas for the deaths of more hostages.
Publicly, Trump supports all Israeli actions
Any hope that the United States would force Israel to adhere to a lasting ceasefire faded with Trump’s inauguration. Although Trump pressured Netanyahu to agree to the January ceasefire, his administration’s approach has since become more confused. Every few days, the American team presents new proposals, but the discussions remain deadlocked. Trump now alternates between disinterest in the conflict and fanciful ideas, such as his suggestion in February that the United States could take control of Gaza and turn it into a tourist “Riviera.”
The Trump administration has not really confronted or attempted to resolve the fundamental contradiction that has slowed serious peace talks: Netanyahu insists that any ceasefire process must end with the dismantling of Hamas. But that is a red line Hamas is unwilling to cross, although it may reportedly consider abdicating political power while retaining its military might, a kind of compromise being tested in Lebanon with the consent of Hezbollah. Neither the Americans nor Arab mediators from Egypt and Qatar, however, have so far been able to persuade Hamas leaders to sign an agreement that would put an end to their ultimate political mission: to take control of the Palestinian struggle against Israel.
Other developments have made it less urgent for Netanyahu to seek an agreement. By now, Israel's military has partially recovered from the shock of October 7. Hamas's ability to mount another large-scale attack or to launch significant rocket barrages into Israeli territory has deteriorated. On other fronts, Israel now holds the upper hand. Last November, "Hezbollah" was forced to agree to a humiliating ceasefire, and although the Israeli air force continues to strike the group’s targets in southern Lebanon (including last week in Beirut), the devastated organization has yet to respond.
The exchange of fire between Israel and Iran last October was an unfavorable development for Tehran. And after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December, Israel took control of parts of southern Syria. Against the backdrop of these victories, Netanyahu seems bold, responding with military force to enemy provocations that he would have previously preferred to contain or ignore. In mid-March, for example, after six rockets fell on its territory, Israel bombed a Hezbollah drone warehouse in South Beirut, although it remains unclear who fired the rockets.
While the Biden administration stood by Israel after October 7 and helped prevent further regional escalation, it has also sought to limit Israeli military action. For example, after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded the southern Gaza city of Rafah last May—an act that Biden’s team had warned against—Biden delayed sending heavy precision munitions and bulldozers to Israel.
Trump’s entry into the White House has removed this counterbalance. At least publicly, Trump supports all of Israel’s actions. And more broadly, the way he flirts with ideas like swallowing up Canada and annexing Greenland legitimizes the idea that powerful countries can simply grab territory from their neighbors. When Netanyahu visited Trump in Washington in February, the US president wondered aloud why Israel didn’t take advantage of Assad’s overthrow to claim even more Syrian land. Netanyahu subsequently discussed such an idea with his cabinet, although it has not gained traction.
Hidden Cracks
Israel appears to be in a position to command. Indeed, in mid-March the military presented an ambitious plan to the government to redeploy several divisions to Gaza, conduct a new mobilization of reservists, evict residents of northern Gaza back to a humanitarian zone in the south, and complete a military occupation of the entire strip—all within a few months.
Former Israeli army chief of staff Herzi Halevi was fiercely opposed to the establishment of any Israeli military administration in Gaza. But he resigned in early March. His successor, Eyal Zamir, who enjoys warmer relations with Israel’s political leaders and therefore has more freedom to pursue his own agenda, has shown that he is prepared to govern the Strip.
The Trump administration may have stopped talking about a plan to clear Gaza of its residents, but right-wing Israeli politicians have taken up the cause, interpreting Trump’s proposal as permission to discuss more openly encouraging Gazans to emigrate voluntarily. In practice, any such “voluntary emigration” project would involve the use of significant military force to persuade residents to leave. Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz, who is essentially Netanyahu’s puppet, has created a new administrative body within his ministry to encourage emigration.
But deeper weaknesses and internal tensions are constraining the Israeli government. Despite the blows it has suffered, Hamas is far from defeated. Two surviving military commanders, Izz al-Din al-Haddad and Mohammed Sinwar (brother of Yahya Sinwar), are leading efforts to rebuild the group. The weeks-long ceasefire that began in January, which facilitated the delivery of more humanitarian aid to Gaza, has also allowed Hamas to raise funds by confiscating some of that aid and selling it to Gazan civilians at a profit.
Israel has estimated that Hamas has recruited around 20,000 new fighters in recent months, and the group's leaders have been trying to quell protests against its rule in northern Gaza. Hamas is redirecting Israeli bombs that have failed to explode into buildings and roads in preparation for a new Israeli invasion.
Israeli reservists are exhausted
A reoccupation of Gaza will result in additional military casualties and, very likely, the deaths of more hostages. According to numerous opinion polls, about 70 percent of Israelis support a deal with Hamas to release all remaining hostages, even if it comes at a very high price, such as ending Israel’s military operations in Gaza and releasing thousands of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. But it is uncertain whether this public sentiment will translate into a protest that could limit Netanyahu’s options. Many Israelis still find it extremely difficult to demonstrate against their government while Israeli soldiers are fighting and dying in Gaza.
But implementing either the military plan to occupy Gaza or the "voluntary emigration" project would carry serious political risks. Tens of thousands of military reservists have already served hundreds of days in the war, which has taken a heavy toll on their careers and families. In fact, Israel has never faced such ambivalence about military service from its reservists - not even during its politically controversial 1982 war in Lebanon or during the second intifada, which lasted from 2000 to 2006.
Some are threatening to refuse to be drafted, fearing that a new large-scale military campaign could lead to the deaths of more hostages. According to several Israeli military commanders, many reservists are considering avoiding service to be with their families. Some reservists’ anger is linked to the government’s behavior outside Gaza, such as its efforts to preserve the exemption of ultra-Orthodox Jews from mandatory military service. But overall, Israeli reservists are exhausted by this military campaign.
Netanyahu must continue to strike a delicate balance. From his perspective, he must delay implementing any ceasefire that would end the war and rule out the fantasy of rebuilding Israeli settlements in Gaza, to satisfy his right-wing allies. But he cannot sound as decisive as those allies about the full reoccupation of Gaza and the resettlement of Israelis there.
So far, he has had some success: The Israeli parliament’s passage of the budget in late March averted the threat that his coalition might collapse, leading to early elections. But a recent cabinet meeting revealed the challenge of maintaining that balance. After Netanyahu said the government was considering various ideas for the future of Gaza, including handing over control to a consortium of Arab states, the far-right Settlements Minister, Orit Struck, was outraged. "But Gaza is ours, part of the land of Israel," she exclaimed. — Are you going to give it to the Arabs?" The prime minister dodged the question. "Maybe military rule—there are all sorts of options," he replied.
The Israeli prime minister must not only maneuver between a public demanding the release of the remaining hostages and the visions of grandeur of his political partners. He must also deal with Trump’s instinct to chase glory. The US president may still be pursuing his own grand plan: a mega-deal between the US and Saudi Arabia that includes normalising diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as an end to the war in Gaza. And Netanyahu is now facing a new scandal after two of his media advisers were arrested and questioned about money they may have illegally accepted from the Qatari government. But the Israeli prime minister has proven resilient. He intends to hold on to his post by any means necessary. Keeping the war in Gaza going is the easiest way to do that, regardless of the long-term cost to the hostages, the Palestinians, the Middle East and Israel itself.