Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov as Russia's defense minister on May 12. He moved Shoigu to the post of Secretary of the Security Council in place of Nikolai Patrushev. These high-level reshuffles since the Russian presidential election strongly suggest that Putin is taking significant steps toward mobilizing Russia's economy and defense industrial base to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO. Russia's Federation Council published a list of Putin's proposed cabinet ministers on May 12, specifically confirming that Putin had "proposed" Belousov for the new Minister of Defense (his proposals are orders).
This is stated in the daily analysis of the Institute for the Study of War.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told TASS that Shoigu, who has been Russia's defense minister since 2012, will take over as secretary of the Security Council and act as Putin's deputy on Russia's military-industrial commission.< /p>
Peskov also reported that Putin relieved Patrushev of his previous position as Secretary of the Security Council "due to his transfer to another job", which was not specified. The Kremlin will announce his new role in the "near future". Peskov also noted that Army General Valery Gerasimov will remain the chief of the Russian General Staff and no change in this position is foreseen for now. At the moment, Gerasimov is also the commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Ukraine.
Belousov's appointment as Russia's defense minister is a significant development in Putin's efforts to put the full economic conditions in place for a protracted war. Belousov has no military experience and is an economist by profession — he served as Russia's Minister of Economic Development from 2012-2013, following a career in economic analysis and forecasting between 1981 and 2006.
His lack of military experience is not unusual - Shoigu also had no experience in uniform before taking over the Ministry of Defense.
Belousov then served as First Deputy Prime Minister from 2020 until his new appointment in 2024. He is a known advocate of greater government involvement in the economy.
Peskov announced Belousov's appointment to the state news channel TASS on May 12 and explained that "it is very important to fit the economy of the security bloc into the vertical of internal security in the economy of the country". This suggests that the Kremlin intends to integrate and streamline industries related to Russia's security and defense forces with broader domestic economic policy.
Several Russian insiders responded similarly to Belousov's new position. It shows that Putin has serious concerns about the levels of corruption and misuse of funds in the Russian military, the conflicts between the military and the Russians, and the perceived ineffectiveness of the Russian defense as a hole.
An unnamed Russian federal official told the Russian opposition newspaper Vazhnye istorii that Belousov will work to "competently organize work and logistics processes, ensure the necessary production and supplies, orient the economy to a "special military operation" and pushing the technological maximum out of the defense industry."
A well-known Kremlin-awarded blogger noted that Belousov's new role "marks the beginning of a large-scale audit and restructuring of all financial models" in the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Belousov has a reputation as an effective technocrat, and insiders say he has a positive relationship with Putin.
Belousov met with Putin in November 2023 to discuss projects and technology cooperation and has spoken with Putin about issues with Russia's domestic drone production. Belousov also recently highlighted a draft government order for 4.4 billion rubles (roughly $48 million) for drone production by 2030, as well as plans to financially support drone manufacturers and train drone developers and operators. A focus on maximizing technological innovation, particularly in the area of drones, is likely to be extremely valuable to the Kremlin's military efforts. Recently, the Kremlin had to consider the difference between the production of Russian drones and the modern realities of the battlefield.
Belousov personally announced in January 2023 that Russia had finalized the "Unmanned Aviation Systems" project, which earmarks 696 billion rubles (about $7 billion) for the production of 32,000 drones a year by 2030.
Patrushev's replacement as Security Council secretary by Shoigu is in line with Putin's general pattern of quietly removing senior security officials, giving them peripheral roles in the Russian security sphere, rather than simply firing them. The Russian Security Council is an advisory body that also plays a role in the implementation of security-related policies and the development of Russia's strategic culture, making Shoigu's appointment as Secretary of the Security Council and de facto demotion from the prestigious post of Minister of Defense to Russia less humiliating.
Putin removed Shoigu from the Defense Ministry's direct chain of command, but granted him continued influence in the security space. Shoigu remained an important and loyal subordinate, and sometimes a scapegoat, and Putin likely benefits from retaining Shoigu's leadership and experience in some official capacity. Shoigu's removal also follows two high-profile incidents - the removal of his reported ally, Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on corruption charges, and Putin's meeting with Shoigu's political opponent and Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin to discuss updates that were likely leading indicators of Kremlin actions in preparation for Shoigu's removal from his long-held position.
Putin has previously similarly removed his failed generals by appointing them to peripheral security and defense positions outside the direct chain of command, sometimes allowing them to redeem themselves and return to Putin's favor , as assessed by ISW.
Putin's removal of Patrushev from the Security Council is notable, however, as several Western and Russian reports that Patrushev is a close personal ally of Putin - the Wall Street Journal claimed in December 2023 that he was the person responsible for the murder of the financier of "Wagner" Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023
The WSJ reported that Patrushev's appointment as Secretary of the Security Council in 2008 was largely a formality, and he is the de facto head of all Russian security services, the second most powerful man in Russia.
Putin has largely reappointed the heads of Russia's main security services, suggesting he maintains a core cadre of loyal silovaki. Putin reappointed Vladimir Kolokoltsev as Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergey Naryshkin as Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Alexander Bortnikov as Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Viktor Zolotov as Director of the Rosgvardia.
ISW has previously assessed that Russia's security services and related silovaki, particularly Bortnikov, were key voters in electing Putin to his fifth term, and Putin relies heavily on the work of the aforementioned security agencies. to maintain the stability of the regime, especially after the failed rebellion of the "Wagner" group.
Kolokolstev played an important role in coordinating the Kremlin's migrant policy (which was especially important after the March 22 Islamic State attack on Crocus City Hall); Naryshkin was an important player in creating information conditions and propagandizing justifications for the war; Putin personally praised Bortnikov and the FSB for protecting Russian sovereignty; and Zolotov headed the effort to take on former fighters from the group "Wagner" in Rosgvardia.
These silovaki form the backbone of Putin's core cabinet, and their reassignment suggests that Putin will continue to rely on them and give them power in his next term.
Russian offensive efforts to capture Vovchansk (northeast of the city of Kharkiv) are largely a consequence of the tacit Western policy that Ukrainian forces cannot use Western-provided systems to strike legitimate military targets in Russia. Russian forces appear to be trying to encircle Vovchansk, while Russian forces are approaching the city itself through Bukhruvatka, Staritsa and Izbytske to the west on road C-210817 and through Vovchansk Khutori to the east on road O-210825.
A Russian capture of any of these settlements would sever these Ukrainian land lines of communication to Vovchansk and make the remaining GLOCs (Highway T-2104) increasingly critical to the city's defense. Russian forces are also increasingly targeting bridges across nearby bodies of water to isolate Ukrainian defenses of Vovchansk from other areas.
Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets assessed that Vovchansk was the main Russian effort in the northern direction of Kharkiv Oblast and that Russian forces intended to surround Vovchansk itself from the southwest and south. Mashovets noted that Vovchansk's proximity to the international border affords Russian forces "many opportunities," including allowing Russian forces to conduct operations with limited forces and means to achieve a specific outcome; provides Russian forces with a "small footing" to allow them steady control and fire support without moving their artillery; and allows rapid delivery of fuel and weapons to the front line.
Russian forces are taking advantage of a long-standing Western restriction on Ukraine from using Western-supplied weapons to strike legitimate military targets on Russian territory - territory that Russian forces now depend on to sustain their offensive operations in the northern part of Kharkiv region. Western officials have banned Ukraine from using Western-supplied weapons to strike targets on Russian soil, and Ukrainian officials have repeatedly said they are sticking to that condition.
UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron only recently gave Ukrainian forces the green light to use UK-supplied weapons to strike targets on Russian soil. But it is insufficient for Ukraine's needs to interdict Russian territory and comes too late to allow Ukrainian forces to impede Russia's ability to concentrate forces along the international border.
Ukrainian forces have previously used US-supplied HIMARS to devastating effect, notably forcing Russian forces to withdraw from the western (right) bank of Kherson Oblast in November 2022 and continuing to use HIMARS and other weapons, provided by the US and the West to strike at Russia's concentration of forces in the rear and deep rear in occupied Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces regularly carry out drone strikes against infrastructure and airfields in Russia, but they lack the same interdiction effects they need to generate to undermine Russian offensive operations.
Ukrainian forces would greatly benefit from being able to use advanced long-range weapons systems to disrupt the Russian logistics hubs and routes that currently underpin the Kharkiv offensive, but instead must rely on their limited and depleted stockpile of native weapons.