Tariffs and the threat of tariffs will be one of the favorite tools of US foreign policy during the current presidency of Donald Trump. At the same time, he is threatening with tariffs almost all the countries to which he has claims - regardless of whether they are opponents or allies of Washington, the world media write in their analytical materials.
Already introduced, albeit low - 10% additional tariffs on all Chinese imports. An order was signed imposing 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico, although their entry into force was postponed by a month and is unlikely to be implemented, as Ottawa and Mexico complied with Trump's demands for border security and drug trafficking and agreed to start new trade negotiations, which will probably lead to a new trade deal. Trump has already announced the introduction of tariffs on imports from the EU and Japan - also in clear anticipation of the start of new trade negotiations "from a position of strength". Next in line is Great Britain. And then, as they say, down the list.
It is also important that Trump threatens tariffs not only to correct the trade imbalance with the countries in question, but in general to squeeze out any concessions from them, including those that have nothing to do with trade itself. Example - the same Canada and Mexico with a formal pretext of insufficient protection of their borders with the US and the fight against drug trafficking (supply of fentanyl to the US through their territories). Trump even said that he prefers tariffs to sanctions as a tool to force Russia to accept an objectively unacceptable for Moscow option for ending the conflict in Ukraine, which the US intends to promote. This is despite the fact that Russian-American trade is practically zero today.
This use of tariffs and, most importantly, threats of their introduction as the main and almost universal instrument of foreign policy is associated with several reasons.
The first reason. Trump is a staunch supporter of economic mercantilism and sincerely believes that tariffs and other protectionist measures are useful and even indispensable for solving the problems facing the United States at the moment. This is reindustrialization and strengthening American competitiveness in the fight against the main strategic enemy - China.
The desire to reduce the trade deficit and achieve a surplus, reduce imports and increase exports. These are all the basic principles of mercantilism since the time of Thomas Mann (1571-1641), and Trump fully shares them. The current head of the White House does not hide the fact that his idol (besides himself) is the 25th US President William McKinley, whose presidency is considered the apogee of American imperialism (then the US captured Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898) and the “golden age“ foreign economic protectionism.
The second reason is that Trump needs quick, symbolic and at the same time bright victories. They are designed to create the appearance that he is correcting the mistakes and problems accumulated during the presidency of Joe Biden. Show that the efforts he is making are aimed at stopping the "decline" that began under the Democratic United States, which Trump himself constantly talks about, and to "make America great again", are supposedly bringing positive results, and the approach he proclaims is "peace through strength" effective. At the same time, Trump himself is supposedly a master of negotiations and deals. In other words, the 47th president needs visual proof of the rhetoric around which he built his election campaign and which he continues to proclaim to this day.
The concessions that have already been won by Canada and Mexico, and the likely conclusion of a new trade agreement with them, which will again slightly change the North American Free Trade Area (as in Trump's first term) and give the United States some advantages, are doomed to be similar victories for Trump. As well as possible (and very likely) new trade deals with the European Union, Britain, Japan, South Korea and other allies and trading partners (so-called satellites) of the US. Trump also wants a new trade deal with China, but it will be much harder to achieve.
It is important to emphasize that Trump is looking for deals, not wars - be it trade or even more heated ones with direct US participation. They cannot be presented as quick wins. But he does not want to drag the US into long-term conflicts, because they are capable of weakening the US against its competitors, not to mention the negative domestic economic and, accordingly, domestic political consequences. So the threats to impose 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico were from the very beginning an invitation to dialogue from a position of strength in order to achieve a quick victory, and not an intention to actually start a serious trade war. For the same reason, Trump imposed a cautious 10% tariff on China, which is also an invitation to negotiations, and not the start of a full-scale trade war.
Another thing is that deals with opponents in no way mean the end of the fight. They are a form of its continuation and are designed to provide the United States with even greater advantages in it, to allow the States to distribute costs more optimally, as well as to direct their efforts to other areas and problems of competition. So the trade deal with China is such. If it is achieved under Trump, it will not mean the end of the rivalry between the United States and China.
At the same time, Trump is in a hurry. His desire for quick victories is connected not only with the desire to demonstrate that with his return to the White House begins the “new golden age”, announced by Trump in his inauguration speech. Trump understands that he does not have time to implement his plans - he has only two years. The midterm elections in 2026 will probably lead to the transition of one or both chambers of Congress under Democratic control, which will practically block Trump's policies. In addition, new investigations and impeachment attempts are likely to follow, with an emphasis on the 2028 presidential elections, in which Trump will no longer participate. Hence the high pace that Trump has taken in domestic and foreign policy.
Finally, the third and main reason is to strengthen the competitive position of the United States in the global confrontation with competitors, and above all with China. The qualitative increase in the role and place of the Western Hemisphere in US foreign policy under Trump (the desire to annex Greenland, strengthen dominance over Canada and Mexico, the first overseas tour of Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Central America, etc.) is by no means isolationism and does not indicate Washington's readiness to return to the Monroe Doctrine. Trump and the Republican hawks he appointed to key positions (Marco Rubio, Michael Walz) are no less committed to preserving American supremacy and hegemony than the Democrats and the traditional establishment. Another thing is that he understands this hegemony a little differently - not as preserving the American-centric world order, but as advancing American interests, weakening opponents and the opportunity to prevail on all key issues. At the same time, he uses other fortifications for it - illiberal — methods. Trump's global strategy is a strategy of illiberal hegemony.
A clear illustration of the Trump administration's commitment to American supremacy and hegemony is the commitment to preserving the US dollar as the world's payment and reserve currency and a sharply negative attitude towards the BRICS as the most authoritative anti-hegemonic institution in the modern world, advocating for the formation of a multipolar and fairer economic world order.
At the same time, both Trump himself and his foreign policy circle believe (and this idea generally prevails among the majority of the American elite and establishment) that while the US loses in this confrontation, it loses its competitiveness. The reason for this, they say, lies, among other things, in a system of trade and economic relations in which the greatest relative benefits were not for the United States, but for its counterparties, including allies.
The threat of trade wars can indeed bring the United States (and already does) short-term successes, especially in relations with allies who are ready to make concessions in order to maintain a common relationship with Washington, which their current elites consider existentially important. And even China, traditionally and especially in the context of its own economic difficulties, is not interested in escalating confrontation with the United States and may eventually agree to conclude some kind of trade deal with Washington, which would not mean the end of rivalry for either country.
In the long term, however, Trump's desire to provide a leap forward for America and thus strengthen global supremacy and hegemony is most likely doomed to failure. The formation of a multipolar world, the strengthening of non-Western centers of power and the desire of an increasing number of non-Western countries to strengthen their sovereignty and conduct an independent foreign policy, their unwillingness to be satellites of the United States and serve its interests at the expense of their own, as well as to join one world center against another - fundamental and at the same time irreversible processes. Therefore, the more the United States resorts to blackmail and threats, including through tariffs, the more the majority countries in the world will seek to reduce their dependence on Washington and build their relations not against the United States, but without it. First of all, within the framework of the BRICS and around it. The prospect of this unification during the Trump era will be very indicative in this regard.
Finally, even traditional American allies may eventually start thinking about independence. After all, their subservience to the United States after the end of World War II is explained by the fact that in return they received benefits in the form of security, technology, access to the American market, economic aid, etc. Now America is denying them economic benefits (or rather, sucking the last juices out of them) and even questioning security guarantees. Of course, most of the current elites in Europe and Japan are such American clientele, the product of their social engineering. But in conditions of crisis and the end of the favor of American hegemony, they cannot remain in power indefinitely, and the current growth of right-wing and left-wing "populists" in Europe is a clear illustration of this.