What can we expect from NATO after Donald Trump's USA gave up on protecting Europe. Hungary and Serbia announced that they are forming a military alliance. What could happen in the Balkans… Assoc. Prof. Milen Ivanov, former vice-rector of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, spoke to FACT.
- Mr. Ivanov, the inauguration of US President Donald Trump has shaken up the world order quite a bit, and NATO is no longer the NATO it was at the end of last year. How strong is NATO today?
- Indeed, Donald Trump's accession to power – regardless of whether formally or de facto – has a significant impact on the global order, including on the state and role of NATO. The Alliance is undergoing a major transformation that can be seen both as an identity crisis and as a rethinking of NATO's geopolitical function in a changing world.
NATO's strength today can be analyzed in several dimensions:
NATO still possesses the most powerful military potential in the world, led by the US military – including:
-- about 1 million active military personnel in the US alone
-- over 3.5 million people under NATO flags in total
-- the most modern aviation and navy, including nuclear weapons, located in several countries (US, France, UK).
But in the area of political and strategic cohesion, NATO is weaker than before because:
-- France and Germany are increasingly distancing themselves from the US on strategic issues
-- Turkey is playing an increasingly ambiguous role – NATO member, but with close cooperation with Russia and independent operations in Syria and the Caucasus
-- Hungary and Slovakia question the ideological homogeneity of the Alliance
-- Trump's influence on the US has led to greater isolationism and a preference for national interest over collective security
-- NATO is no longer the undisputed guarantor of the Western order, as it was during the Cold War or even in the 1990s. The Ukrainian crisis and the war with Russia have highlighted Eastern Europe's dependence on the US, but also the lack of political will for direct confrontation, which is quite logical
China is becoming an increasingly important topic, but Alliance members have divergent positions on Beijing
-- NATO is today a military giant, but a strategic colossus on feet of clay. Military – its power is enormous
-- Politically the alliance is shaken, ideologically fragmented and strategically confused
The abrupt change in the rhythm of time and politics has shown that this alliance is unable or unwilling to quickly adapt to new realities
- Does Article 5, which guarantees protection by the Alliance if a country of the pact is attacked, apply with the same force today?
- Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the heart of NATO – the famous principle: “an attack on one is an attack on all”. But, as they say, in real politics - treaties are only as strong as the will to keep them.
What Article 5 says (literally): “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all... and that each of them will take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force..."
It should be noted that it is not said that there will automatically be a military response – the decision is left to each party according to its capabilities and domestic policy.
What would happen in practice if Article 5 were to be activated today? There would be a political discussion (not automatism), since the activation of Article 5 requires consensus in the North Atlantic Council (all members), but each country decides individually what exactly it will do – from military aid, to fuel supplies, logistics, humanitarian aid.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are the only case in which Article 5 has been activated. The response was symbolic: several allies helped with air patrols and support for the US in Afghanistan - but the real war was waged by Washington. Today, even domestically in the US, Trump has repeatedly stated that he will not defend countries that "don't pay for themselves", which calls into question the automaticity of the American response.
- What does this mean for Bulgaria?
- On paper - protected. In practice - it must rely more on regional alliances and its own defense. It is increasingly important to have good bilateral relations with the US and to be an active participant in the common defense, so as not to be neglected.
- America announced that it will not defend a Europe that doesn't pay for itself. In this sense, was Europe spoiled because the US protects it, and in the last 20-25 years, countries have invested very little in their armies?
- This is the central geopolitical fault line that is now coming to the surface, and Trump has simply named it out loud, which was previously a political taboo. Yes, Europe has been spoiled – historically, economically and militarily. After World War II, the US took on the role of guarantor of security in Western Europe through NATO, which guaranteed bases, nuclear umbrellas, military budgets. This allowed Western Europe to focus on economic growth, a welfare state and cultural self-esteem. After the Cold War (especially after 1991), Europe dramatically reduced defense spending, relying on the US for everything – from nuclear defense to spy satellites. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were led by America, with a "European presence for decency".
Trump revealed something that had long been true but had been concealed: "Why should America die for countries that don't pay and often don't even respect us?"
This rhetoric is harsh, but it expresses the US's fatigue with paying the bill and the desire to shift responsibility back to Europe.
Europe is vulnerable today because it does not have a unified army (and it cannot have one, because that would directly threaten the national sovereignty of the member states), there is no rapid response without the US, it depends on American technologies (including satellites, intelligence, communications), and the political elites are used to living under the "American umbrella" while presenting themselves as moral superpowers. Europe is at a crossroads to create an independent defense capacity (e.g. a common army, coordinated industry) or to remain dependent on America – but with a higher price and fewer guarantees. Spoiling has led to strategic vulnerability. Europe lived in a world where history had ended. Now it is returning - with war, borders, an army and cold reality.
- Against this background, we see the formation of military alliances in the Balkans. Serbia and Hungary - on the one hand, and Croatia, Kosovo and Albania on the other. Why did it come to this? What does the formation of these two military alliances show us?
- Balkan geopolitics is once again activated - this time as a reflection of global tremors. We see the formation of blocs along historical, religious and strategic lines, but we are not yet talking about real alliances, but about tests. Verification. Maneuvering. This has come to this due to the shaking of the world order. The USA is no longer a stable guarantor, especially under Trump 2.0. The EU is institutionally paralyzed, and Brussels has no military power. NATO is in a double vacuum – strategic (it is unclear what it is for) and political (internal faults). In such a world, countries are starting to think like in the 19th century – with real policy, not declarations.
The declared intentions of Serbia and Hungary are more like strategic flirtation.
Orban and Vucic are testing the limits of what is possible with the military alliance.
Both countries maintain strong ties with Russia, especially Serbia, do not feel secure in NATO or the EU and are seeking strategic autonomy through a new type of Balkan alliance. This is a political-military signal, not a real pact. Croatia, Albania, Kosovo are directly supported by the USA, and now by France and Great Britain, and are seeking to strengthen their pro-Western orientation. Kosovo and Albania are playing at ethnic unification, Croatia as a Catholic pillar and an anti-Serbian force. But this is also not a formalized alliance, but a sphere of influence linked to NATO/the US – but in the context of increasing autonomy. These are not real alliances yet, but testing the reactions of the great powers: Will Russia react? Will the US give the green light? What will Turkey do? Where will Bulgaria stand?
All this is a field for reconnaissance of strategic attitudes, not for waging war yet.
- What does this mean for Bulgaria?
- We need to think about a post-NATO, post-EU world. Not because membership will be lost tomorrow, but because the guarantees no longer apply automatically. In a real conflict (for example, Serbia and Kosovo), there is no guarantee that NATO will act, the EU will be paralyzed, and the interests of the great powers – divergent. In this context, Bulgaria must have its own game, a clear defense concept, regional balances (good relations with Belgrade, Athens, and Bucharest) and strategic flexibility, instead of blind obedience to Western capitals. These are the rules of the game today! In the new world, there are no longer "eternal correct" ones, there is no "West = good, East = bad". There are interests, military capabilities, and determination.
Bulgaria must observe what is forming around it, not wait for patrons from outside and restore its army, strategic culture, and diplomatic influence.
- What threat is there in the Balkans for countries to start making military alliances?
- A very good question - and especially timely, because if we see the Balkan realities through the eyes of the military and strategic elites, we will understand that this is not about imaginary threats, but about accumulating risks that in the new world chaos can be activated quickly and unexpectedly. There are several main generators of uncertainty. The unresolved Kosovo issue. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, and Kosovo is strengthening its army with the help of the US and Turkey. The Serbian north of Kosovo is a constant zone of tension. In an international vacuum (for example, the weakening of NATO), any provocation can lead to a clash that can lead to a local war, the involvement of Albania, and possibly the destabilization of Bosnia. Serbia-Croatia rivalry. There is a historical enmity, hidden but never forgotten.
Serbia sees Croatia as an “American puppet“, and Croatia sees Serbia as “little Russia“.
Both have relatively modern armies and are actively arming themselves. Bosnia and Herzegovina – a frozen conflict. Republika Srpska (Milorad Dodik) openly talks about secession from the Muslim and Croat parts, which are closer to the West. If Kosovo escalates, Bosnia could erupt again, which means a new civil war under the surface of international structures. The role of Turkey. Turkey has strong influence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania – religiously, culturally and militarily. If Ankara decides to act actively, it could change the balance in the region and turn the Balkans into a zone of influence between Turkey and Russia (again).
Russia and the proxies. Serbia is a traditional ally of Russia and it constantly plays the card of “brotherhood“ with the Serbs, including through hybrid means. In the event of a crisis in Ukraine or the Caucasus, Russia can “activate“ the Balkans to divert NATO's attention. Loss of American control. For the past 20 years, the US has held the Balkan card in its hands. Today, with a withdrawal or focus on Asia, the gap will quickly be filled - by Turkey, Russia or even China.
The Balkans are not preparing for war, but they are preparing for a world without an arbiter. And in this world, unresolved conflicts (Kosovo, Bosnia) are becoming active again, and the alliances we see are attempts at preventive security and positioning.
- And where are we in this scheme? Does Bulgaria have a clear position on how to protect itself at all?
- Very deep and absolutely valid questions. In fact, they contain a large part of the diagnosis of contemporary Bulgarian impotence. Because at this moment in history, when the Balkans are being rearranged, Bulgaria is not simply absent - it is not even present in the thoughts of the great powers. And even worse: it is not present in its own strategic self-image. Bulgaria stands aside, in the position of a passive observer, chained to institutional cowardice and internal instability. We do not have our own Balkan doctrine. We do not have a strategy towards Serbia, Macedonia and Albania. We have a foreign policy that moves according to the instructions of Brussels and Washington, without clearly expressed Bulgarian interests. At best - reactive diplomacy, at worst - complete silence. We have no clear idea how to protect ourselves and this is our greatest strategic weakness. The army is below the minimum operational capabilities. Military and "civilian" intelligence have limited capacity and are under constant political pressure. Border control is partially outsourced (including to FRONTEX), and defense planning is formal. There are no developed scenarios for a refugee wave from Kosovo/Bosnia, for a confrontation between Serbia and NATO, for Turkish-Albanian military-political rapprochement or for a Serbian-Hungarian alliance. Or at least there is no public information about such activity. Bulgaria has the potential to use “soft power“, but it is completely neglected.
In this aspect, Bulgaria could use:
- Cultural diplomacy (language, Orthodoxy, education)
- Economic projects (energy, infrastructure)
- Historical arguments and communities abroad (especially in North Macedonia)
- Sofia as a mediator – neutral zone for Balkan dialogue
But there is no institution, will or coordination to make this a reality. In such critical moments, the state must have the ability to conduct secret and overt negotiations. But we only conduct overt negotiations barely, and then under pressure. Secret negotiations – almost none, because the diplomatic corps is depleted, the security services have no political cover, and in recent decades Bulgarian diplomacy has not created strong bilateral Balkan channels. Unlike us, Hungary and Serbia have strategic channels and secret agreements, Albania and Kosovo act in coordination with Turkey and the USA, and Greece and Romania have historical ties and quiet diplomacy.
- What, in your opinion, is logical to do?
- Building a Balkan doctrine – national, non-partisan, strategic. Rebuilding the army and intelligence – not only as a defense, but also as a diplomatic tool. Active cultural and educational policy in North Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia – "soft power". Creating regional initiatives with Greece and Romania – as a balancer between the western and eastern axis of the Balkans. Training and activating a new generation of diplomats and analysts who think geopolitically.