Post-war Europe has seen its time. Without fully realizing it, we live in a pre-war era. Ukrainians have been fighting on the continent for three years - are we ready to do the same tomorrow? As Putin's Russia's long war tests an entire society, what lessons can we learn from the resilience and mobilization of Ukrainians? Such questions were raised at a panel discussion titled "Can Europe Really Win a War" organized by the French publication Le Grand Continent and featuring Anna Colin Lebedev, a political science professor at the University of Paris-Nanterre, Ian Garner, an expert on Russian military propaganda, Pierre Heilbronn, vice president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Serhiy Marchenko, Ukrainian Finance Minister, and Ukrainian writer Yaroslav Trofimov.
Yaroslav Trofimov: Europe is now in the midst of the bloodiest war since World War II: nearly three years of large-scale fighting in Ukraine, where hundreds of thousands of people have been killed or maimed, millions have been displaced, and entire cities have been reduced to ruins. Yet many Western Europeans do not believe they are at war. Before we can talk about winning a war, we must first admit that we are at war. I was looking at the results of a recent Gallup poll in Europe, where citizens were asked whether they would defend their country if it were attacked: 29% of Spaniards, 23% of Germans, and only 14% of Italians said they would fight for their countries. This mindset is widespread across Europe, driven by wishful thinking – many hope that this conflict in the East can somehow be resolved, that Putin can be appeased with a concession or two on Ukraine. But it is clear that this will not happen, as Russian officials have often stated that their ambitions are much greater. Their goal is to reshape the European security architecture and stop NATO expansion. European taxpayers are rightly reluctant to finance much greater spending on their own defense or in support of Ukraine. The total amount of German military aid to Ukraine, provided and promised, amounts to around 28 billion euros over three years, although much of it has not yet been disbursed. While this is a large sum, it amounts to around two euros per German per week. This is a modest amount that needs to be paid to prevent the war from spreading further.
Mr. Minister, Ukraine, like many other countries, was not ready for war. If you had asked Ukrainians 15 years ago, this was not a country of warriors ready to fight. The Ukrainian army was almost non-existent in 2014. How did this transformation happen? What lessons can the rest of Europe learn from Ukraine’s remarkable ability to mobilize and fight a powerful adversary?
Sergiy Marchenko: Let me start by sharing my personal experience with you. On February 24, 2022 I was about to dive. I had even prepared my equipment. Like most people, I was not expecting a major attack on Ukrainian territory. As a member of the government and the National Security Council, I was fully aware of the potential risks. However, we were still reluctant to fully accept that this could happen. That is why it is so difficult to predict or prepare for the outbreak of war. Today, after more than 1,000 days of conflict - 1,061 days, to be exact - we have a clear idea of what is happening and how to deal with it. One of the most important lessons we have learned is that we must be determined to keep fighting to the end. We must accept the brutal reality that we may be alone in this war. While we are grateful for the support of our partners, in the end it is only the Ukrainians who are fighting against Russia and, in general, other nations that are now involved in the conflict - I will not name them, but you know who I am talking about. It is our collective responsibility to find a way to continue to resist Russia. So the first lesson is that we must remain resolute.
The second lesson is that this is not a sprint, but a marathon: we must prepare for a long fight. If we are ready to fight a long fight, it means that we are well equipped and thinking long-term. We must avoid creating unrealistic expectations, such as thinking that the war will end next month or next year. There is no quick fix, no magic solution. That is why when asked “What will you do in 2025?”, we answer: “We will continue to fight.” Our message to all our partners is that supporting Ukraine is worth it, because we have no choice but to continue. We must prepare for a long war. We should certainly have started preparing for this in 2020, but today we are fully committed to it. Despite the losses of territory, the deaths of civilians and the exhaustion of our army, we must focus on a long-term strategy aimed at a just victory for Ukraine. If we allow ourselves to believe that some political leaders in Europe or the United States will find an easy solution, we are wrong: there is no such plan. Any successful strategy must be based on a strong Ukraine, capable of defending itself in the long term, not just for one year. To illustrate our commitment, we have already prepared our 2025 budget, which includes significant military spending. We plan to allocate more than 50 billion euros to defense: this is half of our total budget. This budget is supported by loans from our partners, which are crucial. These funds give us the certainty that, despite political decisions or challenges, we are capable of fighting this war until 2025. I think this is a good message for our partners: this is not the time to hesitate, but to find a way to increase support for Ukraine.
Anna Colin Lebedev, you have studied the reaction of Ukrainian society to this war, how do you think European societies will react? What do you think will happen in France, Italy and other countries if they are attacked in a year, two or five years?
Anna Colin Lebedev: I have been studying the dynamics of resistance in Ukraine since 2014 — because it is important to remember that the war did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Over the years, Ukrainian society has transformed and adapted. One of the questions I ask myself is how an ordinary civilian, who never imagined taking up arms or doing anything other than living a normal life, gets involved in this struggle. We are at a similar crossroads in Europe right now. If it is not 2022 yet, then it is somewhere between 2014 and 2022. European societies are already facing non-military attacks from Russia, just as Ukraine was in 2014. So what lessons can we learn from the Ukrainian response? One of the striking features of Ukrainian society is the importance of civil movements: Ukrainians have organized themselves to defend their country in ways that go beyond traditional military action. This is not just about fighting for your country, as we usually understand it. Fighting can take many forms. For many Ukrainians, this means joining the army, supporting it with donations, or participating in activities that are often considered military functions. These include evacuating fighters from the front lines, purchasing equipment for the army, assembling drones, and helping the families of fighters or wounded soldiers. This vast network of civilians has proven incredibly powerful in supporting the war effort. When we ask ourselves whether this example can be useful to us, I ask myself the following question: are we ready for this? Are our countries ready to allow civil society to step in and play a role in national defense? Paradoxically, one of the reasons why Ukrainian citizens have been so active in defending their country since 2014 is their sense of the weakness of their state. In 2014, Ukraine experienced a major political crisis and the army was not at its full potential: civilians understood that if they did not intervene, the country risked quickly losing the war. We often associate weak states with the inability to mobilize their citizens: in Ukraine, the opposite happened. Due to the weakness of the state, the responsibility for defending the country expanded beyond simple political participation or expectation of state support - it became a civic duty. People actively participated in various activities, including fighting in volunteer battalions that were not officially run by the state but played a crucial role. These groups often complemented or even replaced the state in certain regions. Today, although the Ukrainian state is much stronger, the same dynamics are still in effect, with civilians playing a significant role. The question is, will our countries allow citizens to organize themselves to defend their country - especially in response to non-military threats, such as the ones we are currently facing?
Are we ready, for example, to see people preparing for war? That is exactly what Ukrainians are doing within NGOs or self-education schools. What are the expectations of our societies from the state? In many of our societies, we expect it to protect us. If autonomous initiatives emerge, I think our countries will feel threatened by the initiative. That is why we complain about the fact that citizens are not ready to fight, but first we must ask ourselves, drawing on the lessons of Ukraine: are we ready to see our societies participate in the dynamics of combat training?
Pierre Heilbronn, what lessons do you think European countries can learn from the war in Ukraine? What lessons can we learn about how our societies should evolve in response to these challenges?
Pierre Heilbronn: I will continue where Anna left off on the role of states, especially when it comes to Europe. The European project has always been based on the idea of limiting the power of states, since historically states have been the initiators of wars on the continent. The aim was to create a structure in which economic relations between private entities help to reduce aggression and competition between states. This system includes shared sovereignty in economic matters, leading to mechanisms such as the exclusive powers of the European Commission and qualified majority voting in the Council. But this idea of shared sovereignty does not apply to military power, where decisions must always be taken unanimously. This is an area where European integration is lagging behind. This distinction is important if we consider the limits of Europe in the face of wars and their consequences, taking into account the origins of the Union itself. The perception of threat has changed significantly in the last two years. Does the war in Ukraine pose an existential threat to many countries? The situation is very different from the perception of Covid-19, for example. During the 2008 financial crisis, European leaders discussed the possibility of a shared European financing mechanism, but to accelerate action, a shock was needed, recognized by all as a serious threat, namely the mortal threat that affected people during the pandemic. I would also like to reiterate President Macron's remark that there are no red lines when it comes to action at the local level. It is about raising awareness that we are dealing with something serious, something that is neither distant nor abstract for countries like France, Germany, Spain, etc. As for Europe's self-criticism, it is true that we were too slow in our responses - just as we were during the financial crisis. However, we should not forget that a lot has been done. Europe has provided the greatest support to Ukraine, providing €65 billion in civilian aid and €45 billion in military aid. As President Macron said, small efforts are less likely to succeed than larger, more coordinated efforts: we have challenges to overcome, and one of them is the need to focus on what kind of narrative we present to people. Europeans often do not have common nightmares or dreams, and it is these shared experiences that mobilise people. This also means working at the local level.
In France, we have worked to open up mandates so that the French Development Agency can offer sovereign loans to Ukrainian municipalities. I think it is important not to limit cooperation to state-to-state relations, but to also include the local level. Another important area is to create incentives to support the military effort. Although progress has been made, we are not out of the woods yet. We have the Economic Resilience Action (ERA) instrument, which provides loans for specific purposes. We need to use it to encourage European producers to increase their production by providing greater visibility and financial security. We should also use it to promote joint production between European and Ukrainian defense companies. Financing remains a key issue. When talking about narratives, it is important to emphasize that the battle is not lost and that there are good examples of success. In the Czech Republic, for example, a major campaign made it possible to present refugees as an asset for the Czech economy, not just a cost. This speech helped to gain much greater support for Ukraine.
Although Europe is increasingly aware of the importance of the war in Ukraine, most Europeans still do not perceive themselves as being at war - and technically they are not. The daily lives of the French, Germans and Italians have not changed significantly. Meanwhile, President Putin continues to present the conflict as a war between Russia and the West. Although there has been no direct military action on NATO territory, the nature of war has changed: we are seeing a rise in hybrid warfare - acts of sabotage, election interference, cyberattacks and attempts to influence Western societies from within.
Ian Garner, as a historian and Russia specialist, to what extent is this type of grey area hostility crucial for Europe? And, more importantly, how prepared are Europeans to confront this growing threat?
Ian Garner: Europe is 0% ready. I think we are actually less prepared today than we were two years ago. Russia is very clear in its speech: it sees itself in an existential struggle with the West, in a fight for its survival. Whether this story is true or not is irrelevant - what matters is the story that Russia tells. On the domestic market, it has managed to sell the idea that if it does not fight, if it does not destroy Ukraine in the most brutal and criminal way - through murder, rape, deportation of children and devastation of cities like Mariupol - then it will not be able to recover. We are talking about the loss of Russia's identity as an imperial power after 1991. The state claims that Russia has been humiliated by the West: Poland is joining the European Union, Estonia will gain freedom, and the United States will continue to weaken Russia's positions. While I think Russia emerged from the Cold War in a better position than it thought, this sense of loss runs deep.
The state is telling its people: "We must fight or we will be destroyed." It is a powerful message, made all the more compelling by social media promoting dramatic, capitalist fantasies - epic videos showing how Mariupol will be grandly rebuilt, for example. Of course, this is just propaganda. In reality, the reconstruction efforts are minimal: just a few hastily built apartment buildings. But the story goes on. For the average Russian, witnessing the destruction of Ukraine is seen as something that can only help them.
But what narrative do we have in Europe and North America to convince people that we are in this kind of conflict? Russian hybrid attacks - especially those using social media - are designed to exacerbate societal divisions. What stories can we use to respond, and how can we develop them? I would argue that the answer lies beyond the nation-state. The fact that only 14% of people in Italy are willing to defend their country should make us realize that society may be increasingly uniting around post-national ideas. Many on the right in Italy may feel closer to supporters of Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, or even Russian political movements that promise strength, masculinity, and a revived national identity. They may feel they have more in common with these figures than with their liberal, left-wing neighbors. To address this, we need to create stories that resonate with people’s sense of identity, convincing them that they have a just cause to fight. Citizens will not fight for the European Union—important as it is, the Union is perceived as a bureaucratic and distant institution that is currently not a source of inspiration. Russia understands this by exploiting these divisions and relentlessly reinforcing them. At the same time, it has also stepped up its use of physical violence. You said that the war did not seem to affect countries like France or Germany. But it did. With the rise of social media, people are constantly engaged in divisive discourse that fuels hatred towards their neighbors. Russian influence is evident in these digital spaces and creates a polarized environment. But it is not just happening online: ordinary life is starting to feel the effects. You may be the target of a cyberattack at work, or your daily life may be disrupted by incidents like arson, sabotage or attacks on supply chains. But we do not tell people that this is a war. We present it as something peripheral, as if Russia has only intervened on the periphery. In reality, this has a profound impact on our societies.
This is a very strange war, in which one side has fully mobilized its economy, put it on a combat footing, and openly entered into conflict with the West, while we in Europe continue to behave as if nothing had happened. This is especially evident on the economic front: three years have passed since the start of the war in Ukraine, but the military-industrial complex of the United States and Europe has still not been able to increase the production of artillery shells... Mr. Minister, how can we help bridge the gap in Ukraine's military capabilities?
Sergiy Marchenko: We understood that the main drivers of economic growth in Ukraine are private consumption and state investments in various sectors. At the moment, the defense sector is our top priority, because it is not just about survival, but also about creating new opportunities for growth. Our potential for industrial growth, especially in defense, has developed dramatically since the beginning of the war, especially in the last year. I remember very well that at the beginning of this year we understood that there would be no additional budget from the United States between October 2023 and April 2024. We were receiving only minimal in-kind support from the United States, and already in the first quarter of this year we understood that Ukraine would have to take additional measures. Given our limited resources, we had no choice but to start producing our own ammunition, especially 155-mm artillery shells — since we had an acute shortage of them. Another critical point is the nature of modern warfare. These are no longer traditional battles. Tanks are not that effective in this war: they can only be used as artillery platforms, and even modern tanks, such as the Abrams we received, are vulnerable to drones. We have seen this with Russian armored vehicles. Modern warfare involves trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, with troops fighting for small pieces of territory - but supported by artillery and drones. The key element in warfare today is technological progress, especially in the field of electromagnetic warfare. The country that can best use modern technology to neutralize enemy drones and control the battlefield will have a significant advantage: over the past six months, the main request from the Ministry of Defense has been the acquisition of new drones. It has asked the Ministry of Finance for additional funds to purchase them, as drones have become a major focus. Missiles remain important: we have already successfully launched Ukrainian cruise missiles and are preparing to launch our own ballistic missiles.
We know that Russia has the advantage in missile capabilities and can easily target our energy infrastructure - including transformers and the power grid. To resist and counter this threat, we must develop such capabilities: there is no other way to deter Russia. If it perceives us as weak and unable to protect our critical infrastructure, this will escalate quickly. It is only a matter of time before it achieves its goals. Therefore, we must demonstrate our willingness and ability to defend ourselves.
Oil exports are the engine of the Russian military machine. Without the revenue from these exports, Russia could not continue to acquire and produce weapons. But so far, Ukraine has not attacked any of Russia's oil export points, even though they are nearby in the Black Sea. Why?
Sergiy Marchenko: We targeted their refineries and successfully reached some of them this year. As for the attacks on the oil fleet, that could be another target, but there is a broader global consensus that we should not upset the balance between countries that have agreed to oil price caps - ensuring that prices do not fall below or rise above certain levels. That is a trade-off that we have to take into account.
What you are essentially saying is that the war is existential for Ukraine... but only as long as oil prices remain stable?
Sergiy Marchenko: Let me answer you with a quote from Ronald Reagan's 1984 presidential campaign: "Some people see the bear in the woods. To some, the bear is easy to spot; to others, it is invisible. Some say the bear is gentle; others that it is bloodthirsty and dangerous. Since no one can be sure that they are right, isn't it wise to be as strong as the bear — if it really is a bear?"
Despite the increasing political instability on the continent - especially in France and Europe - how can we ensure that the defence of the Union becomes a top priority?
Pierre Heilbronn: We are increasingly aware that this is a critical issue, but it is true that the situation is different in different countries. Support for Ukraine is much greater in France than in Italy, for example, or in other countries. Of course, support is also stronger in Russia's neighbouring countries. But what we need now is to equip ourselves with the necessary infrastructure and to take defence issues seriously. I come from a country that has a long tradition of investing in defence - even if it has often done so on its own. For decades, we were one of the few nations that adhered to NATO's investment guidelines, although this has somewhat diminished since the end of the Cold War. Progress is slow, but the situation is changing. One of the main problems is the lack of coordinated planning that integrates financial and defence resources. Each member state tends to act in isolation, and although the European Commission and the High Representative have a key role, the approach is still in its infancy. It is essential to determine how to identify the gaps in Ukraine’s needs and how to fill them by coordinating with other European and global manufacturers. A key part of this planning is understanding Ukraine’s dependence on vital supplies such as ammunition in the coming months. If the United States were to stop supplying certain equipment, this would have serious consequences. Europe needs to plan for these scenarios. We also need to ensure that the defense industry in Europe is aware of the available funding, as loans to cover Ukraine’s financial deficits for 2025 are already available. The real challenge is not just funding; it is the ability to plan, program and integrate efforts between European countries and their industries. This does not mean that we should rely only on European industries. As you mentioned, initiatives such as those of Denmark and Norway are crucial. While not a complete solution, it shows that the combination of access to capital for Ukraine’s defence industry and European planning capacity can allow us to respond effectively to the production challenges we face. The scale, speed and coordination of efforts will be essential to move forward.
I would like to return to a point that Minister Marchenko made about the evolving nature of the war in Ukraine. He pointed out that tanks are largely obsolete. What we see today is that there are practically only two armies in the world – Russia and Ukraine – that have the capacity, capability and experience to wage modern warfare. Western militaries, including the US Army, have not faced a competitor since the Korean War. In these circumstances, what do you think Western armies have learned from the conflict in Ukraine? How much more do they have to learn, and how seriously do they take these lessons?
Ian Garner: I can speak from my experience in Canada, where I work closely with military personnel, including faculty at the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. There is a clear understanding within the Canadian military community that lessons need to be learned from recent conflicts. However, there is absolutely no political support to provide the military resources to implement these lessons. Given Canada’s commitment to NATO, this lack of support is likely a common problem across Europe. Justin Trudeau’s government has set a goal of reaching 2% of GDP on defence spending by the mid-2030s. Unfortunately, Trudeau risks losing the next election, and his successor, Conservative leader Pierre Poiliever, has shown little interest in increasing defence spending. There is a lack of national political will to recognize the current situation as a war, which is hampering the military’s ability to prepare and adapt. The Canadian military is moving into the Baltics and strengthening its partnerships there, but without the budget and resources to invest in critical areas like drones or to engage in advanced military tactics like cyberwarfare or hybrid warfare, this is a near-impossible task. The roots of this problem are money, political will, and a lack of public support. Without a shift in public perception—one that recognizes that we are not in a post-Cold War world, but one in which war and chaos are becoming the norm—things really won’t change.
This problem is not unique to Canada. Many European countries, including the UK, are facing similar challenges. Despite all the rhetoric about the need to deter Russia, the British military is reducing its overall capabilities in real terms. How do you think European companies can be convinced? What needs to be done to get the message across?
Anna Colin Lebedev: Let me offer a little optimism: a society that is not ready for war can adapt and prepare relatively quickly. Ukraine provides us with a vivid example. Minister Marchenko began by saying that on the evening of February 23, 2022, he did not expect a large-scale invasion the next day. However, when it was necessary, Ukraine was able to mobilize its intellectual, institutional and financial resources to respond effectively. Of course, let us hope that we will never face a massive invasion of our own territories. But before such a scenario happens, what can we do? I think we need to encourage a meaningful debate, not just develop narratives. These debates should be based on the Ukrainian experience. Why? Because Ukraine has many similarities with European societies: it is an urbanized country, highly educated, with a democratic system, liberal values, and a population that values personal development. When such a society, so similar to ours, is confronted with war, we can learn a lot about how it adapts and the challenges it faces: there is much talk, for example, about the need for the Ukrainian army to mobilize fighters. This is a great starting point for discussing the role of civilians in protecting their society. The idea of the citizen soldier may not correspond to the contemporary identity of Ukrainian or European citizens who value their autonomy and do not see themselves as soldiers on the front lines, but it is worth exploring the development of the situation. Ukraine is adapting to this situation in a creative way. We need to move beyond the narrow media focus that often reduces conflict to frontline movements that do not resonate with the general public. It is important to give real meaning to the conversation. We need to explore what it means for every citizen — depending on their social status, skills and sense of duty — to participate in the defense of their society. I recently wrote an article for Le Grand Continent on this issue, and now is a good time to have these conversations. We still have time to prepare, but now is the time to start these debates.
Europe is increasingly realizing — at least in the conversations we are having here — that we are living more in a pre-war era than in the post-war era that we have long taken for granted. Looking back and your experience, what advice would you give to European citizens and decision-makers to prepare for an uncertain and potentially unstable future?
Sergiy Marchenko: To give useful advice, you first have to earn the privilege of doing so. I don’t think we have yet earned that right in Ukraine, even with the lessons we have learned: we are still in the middle of our struggle. Much more needs to be done to strengthen our government capacity — this is a critical vulnerability. As Anna Colin Lebedev rightly noted, we started with a weak state, lacking the institutional strength to fully perform basic state functions. So we also have a lot to learn from Europe when it comes to strengthening our country and strengthening our democratic institutions. We must recognize that this is not just a media narrative, but a very real, very immediate war. However, I am not proposing some militarized "camp mentality", nor a campaign of preparedness. Personally, as a minister, I am not prepared for combat: I have not trained to fight or kill, and I sincerely hope that I will never find myself in a situation where I have to do so. This is a natural human state of mind - most people are not interested in becoming fighters. Only a small part of society is ready to fight. But you still have to prepare yourself mentally for it. This means being ready to face the reality of war and to reconsider our daily attitudes - towards our neighbours, towards other countries - and to ask ourselves what we can do collectively to respond to and prevent such conflicts. The solution lies not only in physical strength, but also in intellectual and emotional resilience. Europe has many brilliant minds who could help us find the answers. That is why I am here: to explore solutions not only to win the war, but also to achieve lasting peace.
Resilience begins in the mind, not only on the battlefield.