In an interview with RIA Novosti, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov summarized the results of 2024, assessed the prospects for starting negotiations to settle the Ukrainian conflict next year, spoke about the fate of Russian military bases in Syria after the change of power there, and explained what changes can be expected in the missile and nuclear sphere.
– Against the backdrop of the West's aggressive policy, can Russia withdraw from the START Treaty before its expiration? Or will Moscow be ready to adhere to the quantitative restrictions under the New START Treaty after February 2026?
– The objective reality is that as a result of the destructive policy of the United States, the foundations of strategic stability have been significantly shaken, and in some places destroyed. At the same time, given the extreme anti-Russian sentiments of the still-acting American authorities, there are currently no conditions for a strategic dialogue with Washington. Until the Americans abandon their current anti-Russian course, we will not conduct any negotiations with them on arms control.
This does not mean that Russia will not voluntarily implement a number of measures to maintain an acceptable level of predictability in the missile and nuclear sphere, which we are doing. In particular, we continue to adhere to the quantitative limitations on the relevant weapons provided for in the START Treaty. In addition, Russia's unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based missiles with intermediate and shorter ranges (INF) remains in force. Other steps are being taken.
However, as we have repeatedly stated, the appropriateness of these measures directly depends on the extent to which they meet our interests. We assess the situation based on an analysis of the destabilizing actions of the United States and NATO in the strategic sphere and, accordingly, the evolution of the threats arising from them. Today it is obvious that, for example, our moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles is already practically unviable and will have to be abandoned.
The United States arrogantly ignored the warnings of Russia and China and in practice began to deploy weapons of this class in various regions of the world. As Russian President Vladimir Putin has clearly stated, we will respond to this and respond proportionately. The recent combat test of the latest medium-range hypersonic system “Oreshnik“ convincingly demonstrated our capabilities and determination to apply compensatory measures.
We consistently adhere to what we have stated: clearly including the process of rearmament of Russian strategic nuclear forces within the framework of the START Treaty, we are most closely monitoring Washington's actions.
We see no reason to speculate now what will happen after February 2026, when the New START ceases to exist. Much more can happen next year. So at this stage it would be premature and even unwise to announce our possible moves in this sensitive area.
– A number of experts believe that the new US administration has enough leverage to start negotiations on Ukraine. Do you share this point of view? How likely is it that negotiations on the Ukrainian issue will begin in 2025?
– Of course, both the new and the current administration have such levers. It just needs to apply these levers to itself and its wards in Kiev. If Washington really wanted to end the conflict, it would have stopped the supply of weapons to Kiev, demanded that its satellites follow suit, and ordered its puppets in Kiev to cease fire, resume the negotiation process without any conditions, and revoke Zelensky's decree prohibiting him from participating in negotiations with the Russian leadership.
Our country's position is known and remains unchanged. We are ready for negotiations, but they must be aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and take into account the real situation “on the ground“.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has clearly outlined our main approaches - the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, ensuring its non-aligned, neutral and non-nuclear status, and eliminating long-term threats to Russia's security coming from the West, including NATO expansion.
Kiev must assume specific obligations to guarantee the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens and, of course, recognize the territorial realities enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
The implementation of the specific proposals formulated by the head of state will make it possible to end the conflict and achieve comprehensive, long-term, fair and legally binding agreements. This is the only way to achieve lasting peace.
In the meantime, judging by what we see and read, Kiev and the West have begun to discuss the possibility of some kind of ceasefire and truce in order to get a reprieve and during it to increase the military potential of the Ukrainian armed forces, and then renew their efforts to inflict a “strategic defeat“ on Russia. Of course, this is a dead end. A road to nowhere. There can be no doubt about that.
– In connection with the recent events in Syria, are any changes planned in the updated Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular in the section on military mutual assistance between the parties? Did the withdrawal of Bashar Assad affect the need for closer coordination with Tehran in the defense sector?
– The new agreement, the text of which has long been prepared and agreed upon by the parties, is comprehensive, long-term and does not require adjustments.
The agreement aims to legally consolidate the unprecedented progress in bilateral relations achieved in recent years and to register their transition to the level of strategic partnership.
Of course, such a comprehensive document also has an international component. Among other things, it pays special attention to strengthening cooperation in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels and reinforces the desire of Moscow and Tehran for closer cooperation in the field of security, defense, the fight against terrorism and extremism, and countering many other common threats. In principle, to one degree or another, all this is being done now. However, the signing of the agreement, which we expect to take place soon during the next high-level contact, will open up additional opportunities for further expansion of the Russian-Iranian partnership in priority areas.
– In early December of this year, Denmark transferred the second batch of F-16 fighters to Ukraine. You said earlier that Moscow will view the delivery of these aircraft to Kiev as a “deliberate signal action by NATO in the nuclear sphere“. What measures will Russia take against Denmark and other countries that supply and maintain weapons?
– Back in August 2023, Danish authorities announced plans to send 19 F-16 fighter jets to Kiev. In August and December of this year, it was reported that the first two batches of these aircraft had been transferred to Ukraine. Copenhagen is one of the largest donors of weapons to Kiev, participates in the training of Ukrainian fighters and the supply of mercenaries to the combat zone, and finances the production of military equipment at the enterprises of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, using income from frozen Russian assets.
It has been repeatedly warned that by providing massive military assistance to the Ukrainian Nazis, Denmark, its patrons and allies are provoking an escalation of the conflict, forcing Russia to take adequate measures to ensure the country's security, including military-technical.
Any type of weapons supplied by Western countries to the Kiev regime are a legitimate target and are effectively destroyed by the Russian army.
– Is the Russian side negotiating with the armed opposition in Syria regarding the future of the Russian Federation's military bases in the country?
– The deployment of Russian military bases in Syria is provided for in the current interstate agreements concluded in accordance with international law. Each of them determines the conditions for the operation of these facilities and contains certain obligations of both parties.
Syria is a sovereign state that has the right to conclude and terminate agreements with foreign partners. Over the decades of the existence of the modern Syrian state, many of them have been signed. At the same time, we are not aware of any work by the new authorities on the revision of such acts. The Russian side has not received any requests on this issue. And this is logical. A "transition period" has been declared in Syria until March 1, 2025, and the current government has the status of an interim one, which imposes certain constitutional and institutional restrictions on its policy.
Undoubtedly, the change of power and the change in the situation "on the ground" have made certain adjustments to the Russian military presence in Syria. It is not just about preserving our bases or strongholds, but also about the conditions of their operation, maintenance and provision, as well as interaction with the local side. These topics can become the subject of negotiations with the new Syrian leadership.